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Abstract
We study bisimulation and context equivalence in a probabilistic λ-calculus. The con-
tributions of this paper are threefold. Firstly we show a technique for proving congruence
of probabilistic applicative bisimilarity. While the technique follows Howe’s method, some
of the technicalities are quite different, relying on non-trivial “disentangling” properties for
sets of real numbers. Secondly we show that, while bisimilarity is in general strictly finer
than context equivalence, coincidence between the two relations is attained on pure λ-terms.
The resulting equality is that induced by Levy-Longo trees, generally accepted as the finest
extensional equivalence on pure λ-terms under a lazy regime. Finally, we derive a coinductive
characterisation of context equivalence on the whole probabilistic language, via an extension
in which terms akin to distributions may appear in redex position. Another motivation for the
extension is that its operational semantics allows us to experiment with a different congruence
technique, namely that of logical bisimilarity.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic models are more and more pervasive. Not only are they a formidable tool when
dealing with uncertainty and incomplete information, but they sometimes are a necessity rather
than an option, like in computational cryptography (where, e.g., secure public key encryption
schemes need to be probabilistic [17]). A nice way to deal computationally with probabilistic models
is to allow probabilistic choice as a primitive when designing algorithms, this way switching from
usual, deterministic computation to a new paradigm, called probabilistic computation. Examples
of application areas in which probabilistic computation has proved to be useful include natural
language processing [31], robotics [48], computer vision [8], and machine learning [36].
This new form of computation, of course, needs to be available to programmers to be accessible.
And indeed, various probabilistic programming languages have been introduced in the last years,
spanning from abstract ones [24, 40, 35] to more concrete ones [37, 18], being inspired by various
programming paradigms like imperative, functional or even object oriented. A quite common
scheme consists in endowing any deterministic language with one or more primitives for probabilistic
choice, like binary probabilistic choice or primitives for distributions.
One class of languages that copes well with probabilistic computation are functional languages.
Indeed, viewing algorithms as functions allows a smooth integration of distributions into the
playground, itself nicely reflected at the level of types through monads [20, 40]. As a matter of fact,
many existing probabilistic programming languages [37, 18] are designed around the λ-calculus or
one of its incarnations, like Scheme. All these allows to write higher-order functions (i.e., programs
can take functions as inputs and produce them as outputs).
The focus of this paper are operational techniques for understanding and reasoning about pro-
gram equality in higher-order probabilistic languages. Checking computer programs for equivalence
is a crucial, but challenging, problem. Equivalence between two programs generally means that the
programs should behave “in the same manner” under any context [32]. Specifically, two λ-terms are
context equivalent if they have the same convergence behavior (i.e., they do or do not terminate)
in any possible context. Finding effective methods for context equivalence proofs is particularly
challenging in higher-order languages.
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Bisimulation has emerged as a very powerful operational method for proving equivalence of
programs in various kinds of languages, due to the associated coinductive proof method. To be
useful, the behavioral relation resulting from bisimulation — bisimilarity — should be a congruence,
and should also be sound with respect to context equivalence. Bisimulation has been transplanted
onto higher-order languages by Abramsky [1]. This version of bisimulation, called applicative
bisimulation has received considerable attention [19, 38, 42, 27, 39, 28]. In short, two functions M
and N are applicative bisimilar when their applications MP and NP are applicative bisimilar for
any argument P .
Often, checking a given notion of bisimulation to be a congruence in higher-order languages
is nontrivial. In the case of applicative bisimilarity, congruence proofs usually rely on Howe’s
method [22]. Other forms of bisimulation have been proposed, such as environmental bisimulation
and logical bisimulation [44, 45, 25], with the goal of relieving the burden of the proof of congruence,
and of accommodating language extensions.
In this work, we consider the pure λ-calculus extended with a probabilistic choice operator.
Context equivalence of two terms means that they have the same probability of convergence in all
contexts. The objective of the paper is to understand context equivalence and bisimulation in this
paradigmatic probabilistic higher-order language, called Λ⊕.
The paper contains three main technical contributions. The first is a proof of congruence for
probabilistic applicative bisimilarity along the lines of Howe’s method. This technique consists in
defining, for every relation on terms R, its Howe’s lifting RH . The construction, essentially by
definition, ensures that the relation obtained by lifting bisimilarity is a congruence; the latter is then
proved to be itself a bisimulation, therefore coinciding with applicative bisimilarity. Definitionally,
probabilistic applicative bisimulation is obtained by setting up a labelled Markov chain on top of
λ-terms, then adapting to it the coinductive scheme introduced by Larsen and Skou in a first-order
setting [26]. In the proof of congruence, the construction (·)H closely reflects analogous constructions
for nondeterministic extensions of the λ-calculus. The novelties are in the technical details for
proving that the resulting relation is a bisimulation: in particular our proof of the so-called
Key Lemma — an essential ingredient in Howe’s method — relies on non-trivial “disentangling”
properties for sets of real numbers, these properties themselves proved by modeling the problem
as a flow network and then apply the Max-flow Min-cut Theorem. The congruence of applicative
bisimilarity yields soundness with respect to context equivalence as an easy corollary. Completeness,
however, fails: applicative bisimilarity is proved to be finer. A subtle aspect is also the late vs.
early formulation of bisimilarity; with a choice operator the two versions are semantically different;
our construction crucially relies on the late style.
In our second main technical contribution we show that the presence of higher-order functions
and probabilistic choice in contexts gives context equivalence and applicative bisimilarity maximal
discriminating power on pure λ-terms. We do so by proving that, on pure λ-terms, both context
equivalence and applicative bisimilarity coincide with the Levy-Longo tree equality, which equates
terms with the same Levy-Longo tree (briefly LLT). The LLT equality is generally accepted as the
finest extensional equivalence on pure λ-terms under a lazy regime. The result is in sharp contrast
with what happens under a nondeterministic interpretation of choice (or in the absence of choice),
where context equivalence is coarser than LLT equality.
Our third main contribution is a coinductive characterisation of probabilistic context equivalence
on the whole language Λ⊕ (as opposed to the subset of pure λ-terms). We obtain this result
by setting a bisimulation game on an extension of Λ⊕ in which weighted formal sums — terms
akin to distributions — may appear in redex position. Thinking of distributions as sets of terms,
the construction reminds us of the reduction of nondeterministic to deterministic automata. The
technical details are however quite different, because we are in a higher-order language and therefore
— once more — we are faced with the congruence problem for bisimulation, and because formal
sums may contain an infinite number of terms. For the proof of congruence of bisimulation
in this extended language, we have experimented the technique of logical bisimulation. In this
method (and in the related method of environmental bisimulation), the clauses of applicative
bisimulation are modified so to allow the standard congruence argument for bisimulations in first-
order languages, where the bisimulation method itself is exploited to establish that the closure of
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the bisimilarity under contexts is again a bisimulation. Logical bisimilarities have two key elements.
First, bisimilar functions may be tested with bisimilar (rather than identical) arguments (more
precisely, the arguments should be in the context closure of the bisimulation; the use of contexts
is necessary for soundness). Secondly, the transition system should be small-step, deterministic
(or at least confluent), and the bisimulation game should also be played on internal moves. In
our probabilistic setting, the ordinary logical bisimulation game has to be modified substantially.
Formal sums represent possible evolutions of running terms, hence they should appear in redex
position only (allowing them anywhere would complicate matters considerably), also making the
resulting bisimulation proof technique more cumbersome). The obligation of redex position for
certain terms is in contrast with the basic schema of logical bisimulation, in which related terms
can be used as arguments to bisimilar functions and can therefore end up in arbitrary positions.
We solve this problem by moving to coupled logical bisimulations, where a bisimulation is formed
by a pair of relations, one on Λ⊕-terms, the other on terms extended with formal sums. The
bisimulation game is played on both relations, but only the first relation is used to assemble input
arguments for functions.
Another delicate point is the meaning of internal transitions for formal sums. In logical
bisimilarity the transition system should be small-step; and formal sums should evolve into values
in a finite number of steps, even if the number of terms composing the formal sum is infinite.
We satisfy these requirements by defining the transition system for extended terms on top of
that of Λ⊕-terms. The proof of congruence of coupled logical bisimilarity also exploits an “up-to
distribution” bisimulation proof technique.
In the paper we adopt call-by-name evaluation. The results on applicative bisimilarity can be
transported onto call-by-value; in contrast, transporting the other results is more problematic, and
we leave it for future work. See Section 8 for more details.
1.1 Further Related Work
Research on (higher-order) probabilistic functional languages have, so far, mainly focused on
either new programming constructs, or denotational semantics, or applications. The underlying
operational theory, which in the ordinary λ-calculus is known to be very rich, has remained so far
largely unexplored. In this section, we give some pointers to the relevant literature on probabilistic
λ-calculi, without any hope of being exhaustive.
Various probabilistic λ-calculi have been proposed, starting from the pioneering work by Saheb-
Djahromi [41], followed by more advanced studies by Jones and Plotkin [24]. Both these works are
mainly focused on the problem of giving a denotational semantics to higher-order probabilistic
computation, rather than on studying it from an operational point view. More recently, there
has been a revamp on this line of work, with the introduction of adequate (and sometimes also
fully-abstract) denotational models for probabilistic variations of PCF [11, 16]. There is also
another thread of research in which various languages derived from the λ-calculus are given types
in monadic style, allowing this way to nicely model concrete problems like Bayesian inference and
probability models arising in robotics [40, 35, 20]; these works however, do not attack the problem
of giving an operationally based theory of program equivalence.
Nondeterministic extensions of the λ-calculus have been analysed in typed calculi [3, 47, 27] as
well as in untyped calculi [23, 7, 33, 13]. The emphasis in all these works is mainly domain-theoretic.
Apart from [33], all cited authors closely follow the testing theory [12], in its modalities may or
must, separately or together. Ong’s approach [33] inherits both testing and bisimulation elements.
Our definition of applicative bisimulation follows Larsen and Skou’s scheme [26] for fully-
probabilistic systems. Many other forms of probabilistic bisimulation have been introduced in the
literature, but their greater complexity is usually due to the presence of both nondeterministic and
probabilistic behaviors, or to continuous probability distributions. See surveys such as [5, 34, 21].
Contextual characterisations of LLT equality include [6], in a λ-calculus with multiplicities
in which deadlock is observable, and [15], in a λ-calculus with choice, parallel composition, and
both call-by-name and call-by-value applications. The characterisation in [43] in a λ-calculus with
non-deterministic operators, in contrast, is not contextual, as derived from a bisimulation that
3
M ⇓ ∅
bt
V ⇓ {V }
bv
M ⇓ D {P{N/x} ⇓ EP,N}λx.P∈S(D)
MN ⇓
∑
λx.P∈S(D) D(λx.P ) · EP,N
ba
M ⇓ D N ⇓ E
M ⊕N ⇓ 12 ·D +
1
2 · E
bs
Figure 1: Big-step call-by-name approximation semantics for Λ⊕.
includes a clause on internal moves so to observe branching structures in behaviours. See [14] for a
survey on observational characterisations of λ-calculus trees.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 A Pure, Untyped, Probabilistic Lambda Calculus
Let X = {x, y, . . .} be a denumerable set of variables. The set Λ⊕ of term expressions, or terms is
defined as follows:
M,N,L ::= x | λx.M | MN | M ⊕N,
where x ∈ X. The only non-standard operator in Λ⊕ is probabilistic choice: M ⊕ N is a term
which is meant to behave as either M or N , each with probability 12 . A more general construct
M ⊕p N where p is any (computable) real number from [0, 1], is derivable, given the universality
of the λ-calculus (see, e.g., [10]). The set of free variables of a term M is indicated as FV(M)
and is defined as usual. Given a finite set of variables x ⊆ X, Λ⊕(x) denotes the set of terms
whose free variables are among the ones in x. A term M is closed if FV(M) = ∅ or, equivalently,
if M ∈ Λ⊕(∅). The (capture-avoiding) substitution of N for the free occurrences of x in M is
denoted M{N/x}. We sometimes use the identity term I
def
= λx.x, the projector K
def
= λx.λy.x,
and the purely divergent term Ω
def
= (λx.xx)(λx.xx).
Terms are now given a call-by-name semantics following [10]. A term is a value if it is a closed
λ-abstraction. We call VΛ⊕ the set of all values. Values are ranged over by metavariables like
V,W,X. Closed terms evaluates not to a single value, but to a (partial) value distribution, that is,
a function D : VΛ⊕ → R[0,1] such that
∑
V ∈VΛ⊕
D(V ) ≤ 1. The set of all value distributions is Pv.
Distributions do not necessarily sum to 1, so to model the possibility of (probabilistic) divergence.
Given a value distribution D , its support S(D) is the subset of VΛ⊕ whose elements are values to
which D attributes positive probability. Value distributions ordered pointwise form both a lower
semilattice and an ωCPO: limits of ω-chains always exist. Given a value distribution D , its sum∑
D is
∑
V ∈VΛ⊕
D(V ).
The call-by-name semantics of a closed term M is a value distribution [[M ]] defined in one of
the ways explained in [10]. We recall this now, though only briefly for lack of space. The first step
consists in defining a formal system deriving finite lower approximations to the semantics of M .
Big-step approximation semantics, as an example, derives judgments in the form M ⇓ D , where M
is a term and D is a value distribution of finite support (see Figure 1). Small-step approximation
semantics can be defined similarly, and derives judgments in the form M ⇒ D . Noticeably, big-step
and small-step can simulate each other, i.e. if M ⇓ D , then M ⇒ E where E ≥ D , and vice
versa [10]. In the second step, [[M ]], called the semantics of M , is set as the least upper bound of
distributions obtained in either of the two ways:
[[M ]]
def
= sup
M⇓D
D = sup
M⇒D
D .
Notice that the above is well-defined because for every M , the set of all distributions D such that
M ⇓ D is directed, and thus its least upper bound is a value distribution because of ω-completeness.
Example 2.1 Consider the term M
def
= I⊕ (K ⊕ Ω). We have M ⇓ D , where D(I) = 12 and D(V )
is 0 elsewhere, as well as M ⇓ ∅, where ∅ is the empty distribution. The distribution [[M ]] assigns
1
2 to I and
1
4 to K.
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expone f n = (f n) (+) (expone f n+1)
exptwo f = (\x -> f x) (+) (exptwo (\x -> f (x+1)))
expthree k f n = foldp k n f (expthree (expone id k) f)
foldp 0 n f g = g n
foldp m n f g = (f n) (+) (foldp (m-1) (n+1) f g)
Figure 2: Three Higher-Order Functions
The semantics of terms satisfies some useful equations, such as:
Lemma 2.2 [[(λx.M)N ]] = [[M{N/x}]].
Lemma 2.3 [[M ⊕N ]] = 12 [[M ]] +
1
2 [[N ]].
Proof. See [10] for detailed proofs. 
We are interested in context equivalence in this probabilistic setting. Typically, in a qualitative
scenario as the (non)deterministic one, terms are considered context equivalent if they both converge
or diverge. Here, we need to take into account quantitative information.
Definition 2.4 (Context Preorder and Equivalence) The expressionM⇓p stands for
∑
[[M ]] =
p, i.e., the term M converges with probability p. The context preorder ≤⊕ stipulates M≤⊕N if
C[M ]⇓p implies C[N ]⇓q with p ≤ q, for every closing context C. The equivalence induced by ≤⊕
is probabilistic context equivalence, denoted as ≃⊕.
Remark 2.5 (Types, Open Terms) The results in this paper are stated for an untyped language.
Adapting them to a simply-typed language is straightforward; we use integers, booleans and recursion
in examples. Moreover, while the results are often stated for closed terms only, they can be
generalized to open terms in the expected manner. In the paper, context equivalences and preorders
are defined on open terms; (bi)similarities are defined on closed terms and it is then intended that
they are extended to open terms by requiring the usual closure under substitutions.
Example 2.6 We give some basic examples of higher-order probabilistic programs, which we will
analyse using the coinductive techniques we introduce later in this paper. Consider the functions
expone, exptwo, and expthree from Figure 2. They are written in a Haskell-like language extended
with probabilistic choice, but can also be seen as terms in a (typed) probabilistic λ-calculus with
integers and recursion akin to Λ⊕. Term expone takes a function f and a natural number n in
input, then it proceeds by tossing a fair coin (captured here by the binary infix operator (+)) and,
depending on the outcome of the toss, either calls f on n, or recursively calls itself on f and n+1.
When fed with, e.g., the identity and the natural number 1, the program expone evaluates to the
geometric distribution assigning probability 12n to any positive natural number n. A similar effect
can be obtained by exptwo, which only takes f in input, then “modifying” it along the evaluation.
The function expthree is more complicated, at least apparently. To understand its behavior, one
should first look at the auxiliary function foldp. If m and n are two natural numbers and f and g
are two functions, foldp m n f g call-by-name reduces to the following expression:
(f n) (+) ((f n+1) (+) ... ((f n+m-1) (+) (g n+m))).
The term expthree works by forwarding its three arguments to foldp. The fourth argument is
a recursive call to expthree where, however, k is replaced by any number greater or equal to it,
chosen according to a geometric distribution. The functions above can all be expressed in Λ⊕,
using fixed-point combinators. As we will see soon, expone, exptwo, and expthree k are context
equivalent whenever k is a natural number.
5
2.2 Probabilistic Bisimulation
In this section we recall the definition and a few basic notions of bisimulation for labelled Markov
chains, following Larsen and Skou [26]. In Section 3 we will then adapt this form of bisimilarity to
the probabilistic λ-calculus Λ⊕ by combining it with Abramsky’s applicative bisimilarity.
Definition 2.7 A labelled Markov chain is a triple (S,L,P) such that:
• S is a countable set of states;
• L is set of labels;
• P is a transition probability matrix, i.e. a function
P : S × L × S → R[0,1]
such that the following normalization condition holds:
∀ℓ ∈ L.∀s ∈ S.P(s, ℓ,S) ≤ 1
where, as usual P(s, ℓ,X) stands for
∑
t∈X P(s, ℓ, t) whenever X ⊆ S.
If R is an equivalence relation on S, S/R denotes the quotient of S modulo R, i.e., the set of all
equivalence classes of S modulo R. Given any binary relation R, its reflexive and transitive closure
is denoted as R∗.
Definition 2.8 Given a labelled Markov chain (S,L,P), a probabilistic bisimulation is an equiv-
alence relation R on S such that (s, t) ∈ R implies that for every ℓ ∈ L and for every E ∈ S/R,
P(s, ℓ, E) = P(t, ℓ, E).
Note that a probabilistic bisimulation has to be, by definition, an equivalence relation. This means
that, in principle, we are not allowed to define probabilistic bisimilarity simply as the union of all
probabilistic bisimulations. As a matter of fact, given R, T two equivalence relations, R∪ T is not
necessarily an equivalence relation. The following is a standard way to overcome the problem:
Lemma 2.9 If {Ri}i∈I , is a collection of probabilistic bisimulations, then also their reflexive and
transitive closure (
⋃
i∈I Ri)
∗ is a probabilistic bisimulation.
Proof. Let us fix T
def
= (
⋃
i∈I Ri)
∗. The fact that T is an equivalence relation can be proved as
follows:
• Reflexivity is easy: T is reflexive by definition.
• Symmetry is a consequence of symmetry of each of the relations in {Ri}i∈I : if s T t, then
there are n ≥ 0 states v0, . . . , vn such that v0 = s, vn = t and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n there is j
such that vi−1 Rj vi. By the symmetry of each of the Rj , we easily get that vi Rj vi−1. As a
consequence, t T s.
• Transitivity is itself very easy: T is transitive by definition.
Now, please notice that for any i ∈ I, Ri ⊆
⋃
j∈I Rj ⊆ T . This means that any equivalence class
with respect to T is the union of equivalence classes with respect to Ri. Suppose that s T t. Then
there are n ≥ 0 states v0, . . . , vn such that v0 = s, vn = t and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n there is j such
that vi−1 Rj vi. Now, if ℓ ∈ L and E ∈ S/T , we obtain
P(s, ℓ, E) = P(v0, ℓ, E) = . . . = P(vn, ℓ, E) = P(t, ℓ, E).
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 2.9 allows us to define the largest probabilistic bisimulation, called probabilistic bisimilarity.
It is ∼
def
=
⋃
{R | R is a probabilistic bisimulation}. Indeed, by Lemma 2.9, (∼)∗ is a probabilistic
bisimulation too; we now claim that ∼ = (∼)∗. The inclusion ∼ ⊆ (∼)∗ is obvious. The other way
around, ∼⊇ (∼)∗, follows by (∼)∗ being a probabilistic bisimulation and hence included in the
union of them all, that is ∼.
6
In the notion of a probabilistic simulation, preorders play the role of equivalence relations:
given a labelled Markov chain (S,L,P), a probabilistic simulation is a preorder relation R on S
such that (s, t) ∈ R implies that for every ℓ ∈ L and for every X ⊆ S, P(s, ℓ,X) ≤ P(t, ℓ,R(X)),
where as usual R(X) stands for the R-closure of X, namely the set {y ∈ S | ∃x ∈ X. x R y}.
Lemma 2.9 can be adapted to probabilistic simulations:
Proposition 2.10 If {Ri}i∈I , is a collection of probabilistic simulations, then also their reflexive
and transitive closure (
⋃
i∈I Ri)
∗ is a probabilistic simulation.
Proof. The fact that R
def
= (
⋃
i∈I Ri)
∗ is a preorder follows by construction. Then, for being a
probabilistic simulation R must satisfy the following property: (s, t) ∈ R implies that for every
ℓ ∈ L and for every X ⊆ S, P(s, ℓ,X) ≤ P(t, ℓ,R(X)). Let (s, t) ∈ R. There are n ≥ 0 states
v1, . . . , vn and for every 2 ≤ i ≤ n there is ji such that
s = v1 Rj2 v2 . . . vn−1Rjnvn = t.
As a consequence, for every ℓ ∈ L and for every X ⊆ S, it holds that
P(v1, ℓ,X) ≤ P(v2, ℓ,Rj2(X)) ≤ P(v3, ℓ,Rj3(Rj2(X))) ≤ · · · ≤ P(vn, ℓ,Rjn(. . . (Rj2(Rj1(X)))))
Since, by definition,
Rjn(. . . (Rj2(Rj1(X)))) ⊆ R(X),
it follows that P(s, ℓ,X) ≤ P(t, ℓ,R(X)). This concludes the proof. 
As a consequence, we define similarity simply as .
def
=
⋃
{R | R is a probabilistic simulation}.
Any symmetric probabilistic simulation is a probabilistic bisimulation.
Lemma 2.11 If R is a symmetric probabilistic simulation, then R is a probabilistic bisimulation.
Proof. If R is a symmetric probabilistic simulation, by definition, it is also a preorder: that is,
it is a reflexive and transitive relation. Therefore, R is an equivalence relation. But for being a
probabilistic bisimulation R must also satisfy the property that sRt implies, for every ℓ ∈ L and
for every E ∈ S/R, P(s, ℓ, E) = P(t, ℓ, E). From the fact that R is a simulation, it follows that
if sRt, for every ℓ ∈ L and for every E ∈ S/R, P(s, ℓ, E) ≤ P(t, ℓ,R(E)). Since E ∈ S/R is an
R-equivalence class, it holds R(E) = E. Then, from the latter follows P(s, ℓ, E) ≤ P(t, ℓ, E). We get
the other way around by symmetric property of R, which implies that, for every label ℓ and for
every E ∈ S/R, P(t, ℓ, E) ≤ P(s, ℓ, E). Hence, P(s, ℓ, E) = P(t, ℓ, E) which completes the proof. 
Moreover, every probabilistic bisimulation, and its inverse, is a probabilistic simulation.
Lemma 2.12 If R is a probabilistic bisimulation, then R and Rop are probabilistic simulation.
Proof. Let us prove R probabilistic simulation first. Consider the set {Xi}i∈I of equivalence
subclasses module R contained in X. Formally, X =
⊎
i∈I Xi such that, for all i ∈ I, Xi ⊆ Ei with
Ei equivalence class modulo R. Please observe that, as a consequence, R(X) =
⊎
i∈I Ei. Thus, the
result easily follows, for every ℓ ∈ L and every X ⊆ S,
P(s, ℓ,X) =
∑
i∈I
P(s, ℓ,Xi)
≤
∑
i∈I
P(s, ℓ, Ei)
=
∑
i∈I
P(t, ℓ, Ei) = P(t, ℓ,R(X)).
Finally, Rop is also a probabilistic simulation as a consequence of symmetric property of R and
the fact, just proved, that R is a probabilistic simulation. 
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Contrary to the nondeterministic case, however, simulation equivalence coincides with bisimulation:
Proposition 2.13 ∼ coincides with . ∩ .op.
Proof. The fact that ∼ is a subset of . ∩ .op is a straightforward consequence of symmetry
property of ∼ and the fact that, by Lemma 2.12, every probabilistic bisimulation is also a
probabilistic simulation. Let us now prove that . ∩ .op is a subset of ∼, i.e., the former of being
a probabilistic bisimulation. Of course, . ∩ .op is an equivalence relation because . is a preorder.
Now, consider any equivalence class E modulo . ∩ .op . Define the following two sets of states
X
def
=. (E) and Y
def
= X−E. Observe that Y and E are disjoint set of states whose union is precisely
X. Moreover, notice that both X and Y are closed with respect to .:
• On the one hand, if s ∈. (X), then s ∈. (. (E)) =. (E) = X;
• On the other hand, if s ∈. (Y ), then there is t ∈ X which is not in E such that t . s. But
then s is itself in X (see the previous point), but cannot be E, because otherwise we would have
s . t, meaning that s and t are in the same equivalence class modulo . ∩ .op , and thus t ∈ E,
a contradiction.
As a consequence, given any (s, t) ∈. ∩ .op and any ℓ ∈ L,
P(s, ℓ,X) ≤ P(t, ℓ,. (X)) = P(t, ℓ,X),
P(t, ℓ,X) ≤ P(s, ℓ,. (X)) = P(s, ℓ,X).
It follows P(s, ℓ,X) = P(t, ℓ,X) and, similarly, P(s, ℓ, Y ) = P(t, ℓ, Y ). But then,
P(s, ℓ, E) = P(s, ℓ,X)− P(s, ℓ, Y )
= P(t, ℓ,X)− P(t, ℓ, Y ) = P(t, ℓ, E)
which is the thesis. 
For technical reasons that will become apparent soon, it is convenient to consider Markov chains in
which the state space is partitioned into disjoint sets, in such a way that comparing states coming
from different components is not possible. Remember that the disjoint union
⊎
i∈I Xi of a family
of sets {Xi}i∈I is defined as {(a, i) | i ∈ I ∧ a ∈ Xi}. If the set of states S of a labelled Markov
chain is a disjoint union
⊎
i∈I Xi, one wants that (bi)simulation relations only compare elements
coming from the same Xi, i.e. (a, i)R(b, j) implies i = j. In this case, we say that the underlying
labelled Markov chain is multisorted.
3 Probabilistic Applicative Bisimulation and Howe’s tech-
nique
In this section, notions of similarity and bisimilarity for Λ⊕ are introduced, in the spirit of
Abramsky’s work on applicative bisimulation [1]. Definitionally, this consists in seeing Λ⊕’s
operational semantics as a labelled Markov chain, then giving the Larsen and Skou’s notion of
(bi)simulation for it. States will be terms, while labels will be of two kinds: one can either evaluate
a term, obtaining (a distribution of) values, or apply a term to a value.
The resulting bisimulation (probabilistic applicative bisimulation) will be shown to be a
congruence, thus included in probabilistic context equivalence. This will be done by a non-trivial
generalization of Howe’s technique [22], which is a well-known methodology to get congruence
results in presence of higher-order functions, but which has not been applied to probabilistic calculi
so far.
Formalizing probabilistic applicative bisimulation requires some care. As usual, two values
λx.M and λx.N are defined to be bisimilar if for every L, M{L/x} and N{L/x} are themselves
bisimilar. But how if we rather want to compare two arbitrary closed terms M and N? The
simplest solution consists in following Larsen and Skou and stipulate that every equivalence class
of VΛ⊕ modulo bisimulation is attributed the same measure by both [[M ]] and [[N ]]. Values are
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thus treated in two different ways (they are both terms and values), and this is the reason why
each of them corresponds to two states in the underlying Markov chain.
Definition 3.1 Λ⊕ can be seen as a multisorted labelled Markov chain (Λ⊕(∅) ⊎ VΛ⊕,Λ⊕(∅) ⊎
{τ},P⊕) that we denote with Λ⊕. Labels are either closed terms, which model parameter passing,
or τ , that models evaluation. Please observe that the states of the labelled Markov chain we have
just defined are elements of the disjoint union Λ⊕(∅) ⊎ VΛ⊕. Two distinct states correspond to the
same value V , and to avoid ambiguities, we call the second one (i.e. the one coming from VΛ⊕) a
distinguished value. When we want to insist on the fact that a value λx.M is distinguished, we
indicate it with νx.M . We define the transition probability matrix P⊕ as follows:
• For every term M and for every distinguished value νx.N ,
P⊕(M, τ, νx.N)
def
= [[M ]](νx.N);
• For every term M and for every distinguished value νx.N ,
P⊕(νx.N,M,N{M/x})
def
= 1;
• In all other cases, P⊕ returns 0.
Terms seen as states only interact with the environment by performing τ , while distinguished
values only take other closed terms as parameters.
Simulation and bisimulation relations can be defined for Λ⊕ as for any labelled Markov chain.
Even if, strictly speaking, these are binary relations on Λ⊕(∅) ⊎ VΛ⊕, we often see them just as
their restrictions to Λ⊕(∅). Formally, a probabilistic applicative bisimulation (a PAB) is simply
a probabilistic bisimulation on Λ⊕. This way one can define probabilistic applicative bisimilarity,
which is denoted ∼. Similarly for probabilistic applicative simulation (PAS) and probabilistic
applicative similarity, denoted ..
Remark 3.2 (Early vs. Late) Technically, the distinction between terms and values in Defini-
tion 3.1 means that our bisimulation is in late style. In bisimulations for value-passing concurrent
languages, “late” indicates the explicit manipulation of functions in the clause for input actions:
functions are chosen first, and only later, the input value received is taken into account [46].
Late-style is used in contraposition to early style, where the order of quantifiers is exchanged, so
that the choice of functions may depend on the specific input value received. In our setting, adopting
an early style would mean having transitions such as λx.M
N
−→ M{N/x}, and then setting up a
probabilistic bisimulation on top of the resulting transition system. We leave for future work a
study of the comparison between the two styles. In this paper, we stick to the late style because
easier to deal with, especially under Howe’s technique. Previous works on applicative bisimulation
for nondeterministic functions also focus on the late approach [33, 38].
Remark 3.3 Defining applicative bisimulation in terms of multisorted labelled Markov chains
has the advantage of recasting the definition in a familiar framework; most importantly, this
formulation will be useful when dealing with Howe’s method. To spell out the explicit operational
details of the definition, a probabilistic applicative bisimulation can be seen as an equivalence relation
R ⊆ Λ⊕(∅)× Λ⊕(∅) such that whenever M R N :
1. [[M ]](E ∩ VΛ⊕) = [[N ]](E ∩ VΛ⊕), for any equivalence class E of R (that is, the probability of
reaching a value in E is the same for the two terms);
2. if M and N are values, say λx.P and λx.Q, then P{L/x} R Q{L/x}, for all L ∈ Λ⊕(∅).
The special treatment of values, in Clause 2., motivates the use of multisorted labelled Markov
chains in Definition 3.1.
As usual, one way to show that any two terms are bisimilar is to prove that one relation
containing the pair in question is a PAB. Terms with the same semantics are indistinguishable:
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Lemma 3.4 The binary relation R = {(M,N) ∈ Λ⊕(∅) × Λ⊕(∅) s.t. [[M ]] = [[N ]]}
⊎
{(V, V ) ∈
VΛ⊕ × VΛ⊕} is a PAB.
Proof. The fact R is an equivalence easily follows from reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity
of set-theoretic equality. R must satisfy the following property for closed terms: if MRN , then
for every E ∈ VΛ⊕/R, P⊕(M, τ, E) = P⊕(N, τ, E). Notice that if [[M ]] = [[N ]], then clearly
P⊕(M, τ, V ) = P⊕(N, τ, V ), for every V ∈ VΛ⊕. With the same hypothesis,
P⊕(M, τ, E) =
∑
V ∈E
P⊕(M, τ, V )
=
∑
V ∈E
P⊕(N, τ, V ) = P⊕(N, τ, E).
Moreover, R must satisfy the following property for cloned values: if νx.MRνx.N , then for every
close term L and for every E ∈ Λ⊕(∅)/R, P⊕(νx.M,L, E) = P⊕(νx.N,L, E). Now, the hypothesis
[[νx.M ]] = [[νx.N ]] implies M = N . Then clearly P⊕(νx.M,L, P ) = P⊕(νx.N,L, P ) for every
P ∈ Λ⊕(∅). With the same hypothesis,
P⊕(νx.M,L, E) =
∑
P∈E
P⊕(νx.M,L, P )
=
∑
P∈E
P⊕(νx.N,L, P ) = P⊕(νx.N,L, E).
This concludes the proof. 
Please notice that the previous result yield a nice consequence: for every M, N ∈ Λ⊕(∅),
(λx.M)N ∼M{N/x}. Indeed, Lemma 2.3 tells us that the latter terms have the same semantics.
Conversely, knowing that two terms M and N are (bi)similar means knowing quite a lot about
their convergence probability:
Lemma 3.5 (Adequacy of Bisimulation) If M ∼ N , then
∑
[[M ]] =
∑
[[N ]]. Moreover, if
M . N , then
∑
[[M ]] ≤
∑
[[N ]].
Proof. ∑
[[M ]] =
∑
E∈VΛ⊕/∼
P⊕(M, τ, E)
=
∑
E∈VΛ⊕/∼
P⊕(N, τ, E) =
∑
[[N ]].
And,
∑
[[M ]] = P⊕(M, τ,VΛ⊕)
≤ P⊕(N, τ,. (VΛ⊕))
= P⊕(N, τ,VΛ⊕) =
∑
[[N ]].
This concludes the proof. 
Example 3.6 Bisimilar terms do not necessarily have the same semantics. After all, this is one
reason for using bisimulation, and its proof method, as basis to prove fine-grained equalities among
functions. Let us consider the following terms:
M
def
= ((λx.(x⊕ x))⊕ (λx.x))⊕ Ω;
N
def
= Ω⊕ (λx.Ix);
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Their semantics differ, as for every value V , we have:
[[M ]](V ) =
{
1
4 if V is λx.(x⊕ x) or λx.x;
0 otherwise;
[[N ]](V ) =
{
1
2 if V is λx.Ix;
0 otherwise.
Nonetheless, we can prove M ∼ N . Indeed, νx.(x ⊕ x) ∼ νx.x ∼ νx.Ix because, for every
L ∈ Λ⊕(∅), the three terms L, L⊕L and IL all have the same semantics, i.e., [[L]]. Now, consider
any equivalence class E of distinguished values modulo ∼. If E includes the three distinguished
values above, then
P⊕(M, τ, E) =
∑
V ∈E
[[M ]](V ) =
1
2
=
∑
V ∈E
[[N ]](V ) = P⊕(N, τ, E).
Otherwise, P⊕(M, τ, E) = 0 = P⊕(N, τ, E).
Let us prove the following technical result that, moreover, stipulate that bisimilar distinguished
values are bisimilar values.
Lemma 3.7 λx.M ∼ λx.N iff νx.M ∼ νx.N iff M{L/x} ∼ N{L/x}, for all L ∈ Λ⊕(∅).
Proof. The first double implication is obvious. For that matter, distinguished values are value
terms. Let us now detail the second double implication. (⇒) The fact that ∼ is a PAB implies, by
its definition, that for every L ∈ Λ⊕(∅) and every E ∈ Λ⊕(∅)/∼, P⊕(νx.M,L, E) = P⊕(νx.N,L, E).
Suppose then, by contradiction, that M{L/x} 6∼ N{L/x}, for some L ∈ Λ⊕(∅). The latter means
that, there exists F ∈ Λ⊕(∅)/∼ such that M{L/x} ∈ F and N{L/x} 6∈ F. According to its
definition, for all P ∈ Λ⊕(∅), P⊕(νx.M,L, P ) = 1 iff P ≡ M{L/x}, and P⊕(νx.M,L, P ) = 0
otherwise. Then, since M{L/x} ∈ F, we derive P⊕(νx.M,L, F) =
∑
P∈F P⊕(λx.M,L, P ) ≥
P⊕(νx.M,L,M{L/x}) = 1, which implies
∑
P∈F P⊕(νx.M,L, P ) = P⊕(νx.M,L, F) = 1. Although
νx.N is a distinguished value and the starting reasoning we have just made above still holds,
P⊕(νx.N,L, F) =
∑
P∈F P⊕(νx.N,L, P ) = 0. We get the latter because there is no P ∈ F of the
form N{L/x} due to the hypothesis that N{L/x} 6∈ F.
From the hypothesis on the equivalence class F, i.e. P⊕(νx.M,L, F) = P⊕(νx.N,L, F), we
derive the absurd:
1 = P⊕(νx.M,L, F) = P⊕(νx.N,L, F) = 0.
(⇐) We need to prove that, for every L ∈ Λ⊕(∅) and every E ∈ Λ⊕(∅)/∼, P⊕(νx.M,L, E) =
P⊕(νx.N,L, E) supposing that M{L/x} ∼ N{L/x} holds. First of all, let us rewrite P⊕(νx.M,L, E)
and P⊕(νx.N,L, E) as
∑
P∈E P⊕(νx.M,L, P ) and
∑
P∈E P⊕(νx.N,L, P ) respectively. Then, from
the hypothesis and the same reasoning we have made for (⇒), for every E ∈ Λ⊕(∅)/∼:
∑
P∈E
P⊕(νx.M,L, P ) =
{
1 if M{L/x} ∈ E;
0 otherwise
=
{
1 if N{L/x} ∈ E;
0 otherwise
=
∑
P∈E
P⊕(νx.N,L, P )
which proves the thesis. 
The same result holds for ..
3.1 Relating Applicative Bisimulation and Context Equivalence
In this section, we prove that probabilistic applicative bisimulation is indeed a congruence, and
that its non-symmetric sibling is a precongruence. The overall structure of the proof is similar
to the one by Howe [22]. The main idea consists in defining a way to turn an arbitrary relation
R on (possibly open) terms to another one, RH , in such a way that, if R satisfies a few simple
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conditions, then RH is a (pre)congruence including R. The key step, then, is to prove that RH is
indeed a (bi)simulation. In view of Proposition 2.13, considering similarity suffices here.
It is here convenient to work with generalizations of relations called Λ⊕-relations, i.e. sets
of triples in the form (x,M,N), where M,N ∈ Λ⊕(x). Thus if a relation has the pair (M,N)
with M,N ∈ Λ⊕(x), then the corresponding Λ⊕-relation will include (x,M,N). (Recall that
applicative (bi)similarity is extended to open terms by considering all closing substitutions.) Given
any Λ⊕-relation R, we write x ⊢M R N if (x,M,N) ∈ R. A Λ⊕-relation R is said to be compatible
iff the four conditions below hold:
(Com1) ∀x ∈ PFIN(X), x ∈ x: x ⊢ x R x,
(Com2) ∀x ∈ PFIN(X),∀x ∈ X− x,∀M,N ∈ Λ⊕(x ∪ {x}): x ∪ {x} ⊢M R N ⇒ x ⊢ λx.M R λx.N ,
(Com3) ∀x ∈ PFIN(X),∀M,N,L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x): x ⊢M R N ∧ x ⊢ L R P ⇒ x ⊢ML R NP ,
(Com4) ∀x ∈ PFIN(X),∀M,N,L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x): x ⊢M R N ∧ x ⊢ L R P ⇒ x ⊢M ⊕ L R N ⊕ P .
We will often use the following technical results to establish (Com3) and (Com4) under particular
hypothesis.
Lemma 3.8 Let us consider the properties
(Com3L) ∀x ∈ PFIN(X),∀M,N,L ∈ Λ⊕(x): x ⊢M R N ⇒ x ⊢ML R NL,
(Com3R) ∀x ∈ PFIN(X),∀M,N,L ∈ Λ⊕(x): x ⊢M R N ⇒ x ⊢ LM R LN .
If R is transitive, then (Com3L) and (Com3R) together imply (Com3).
Proof. Proving (Com3) means to show that the hypothesis x ⊢ M R N and x ⊢ L R P imply
x ⊢ML R NP . Using (Com3L) on the first one, with L as steady term, it follows x ⊢ML R NL.
Similarly, using (Com3R) on the second one, with N as steady term, it follows x ⊢ NL R NP .
Then, we conclude by transitivity property of R. 
Lemma 3.9 Let us consider the properties
(Com4L) ∀x ∈ PFIN(X),∀M,N,L ∈ Λ⊕(x): x ⊢M R N ⇒ x ⊢M ⊕ L R N ⊕ L,
(Com4R) ∀x ∈ PFIN(X),∀M,N,L ∈ Λ⊕(x): x ⊢M R N ⇒ x ⊢ L⊕M R L⊕N .
If R is transitive, then (Com4L) and (Com4R) together imply (Com4).
Proof. Proving (Com4) means to show that the hypothesis x ⊢ M R N and x ⊢ L R P
imply x ⊢ M ⊕ L R N ⊕ P . Using (Com4L) on the first one, with L as steady term, it follows
x ⊢ M ⊕ L R N ⊕ L. Similarly, using (Com4R) on the second one, with N as steady term, it
follows x ⊢ N ⊕ L R N ⊕ P . Then, we conclude by transitivity property of R. 
The notions of an equivalence relation and of a preorder can be straightforwardly generalized
to Λ⊕-relations, and any compatible Λ⊕-relation that is an equivalence relation (respectively, a
preorder) is said to be a congruence (respectively, a precongruence).
If bisimilarity is a congruence, then C[M ] is bisimilar to C[N ] whenever M ∼ N and C is a
context. In other words, terms can be replaced by equivalent ones in any context. This is a crucial
sanity-check any notion of equivalence is expected to pass.
It is well-known that proving bisimulation to be a congruence may be nontrivial when the under-
lying language contains higher-order functions. This is also the case here. Proving (Com1), (Com2)
and (Com4) just by inspecting the operational semantics of the involved terms is indeed possible,
but the method fails for (Com3), when the involved contexts contain applications. In particular,
proving (Com3) requires probabilistic applicative bisimilarity of being stable with respect to substi-
tution of bisimilar terms, hence not necessarily the same. In general, a Λ⊕-relation R is called
(term) substitutive if for all x ∈ PFIN(X), x ∈ X− x, M,N ∈ Λ⊕(x ∪ {x}) and L,P ∈ Λ⊕(x)
x ∪ {x} ⊢M R N ∧ x ⊢ L R P ⇒ x ⊢M{L/x} R N{P/x}. (1)
Note that if R is also reflexive, then this implies
x ∪ {x} ⊢M R N ∧ L ∈ Λ⊕(x)⇒ x ⊢M{L/x} R N{L/x}. (2)
We say that R is closed under term-substitution if it satisfies (2). Because of the way the open
extension of ∼ and . are defined, they are closed under term-substitution.
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x ⊢ x RM
x ⊢ x RH M
(How1)
x ∪ {x} ⊢M RH L x ⊢ λx.L R N x /∈ x
x ⊢ λx.M RH N
(How2)
x ⊢M RH P x ⊢ N RH Q x ⊢ PQ R L
x ⊢MN RH L
(How3)
x ⊢M RH P x ⊢ N RH Q x ⊢ P ⊕Q R L
x ⊢M ⊕N RH L
(How4)
Figure 3: Howe’s Lifting for Λ⊕.
Unfortunately, directly prove . to enjoy such substitutivity property is hard. We will thus
proceed indirectly by defining, starting from ., a new relation .H , called the Howe’s lifting of .,
that has such property by construction and that can be proved equal to ..
Actually, the Howe’s lifting of any Λ⊕-relation R is the relation R
H defined by the rules in
Figure 3. The reader familiar with Howe’s method should have a sense of de´ja` vu here: indeed, this
is precisely the same definition one finds in the realm of nondeterministic λ-calculi. The language
of terms, after all, is the same. This facilitates the first part of the proof. Indeed, one already
knows that if R is a preorder, then RH is compatible and includes R, since all these properties are
already known (see, e.g. [38]) and only depend on the shape of terms and not on their operational
semantics.
Lemma 3.10 If R is reflexive, then RH is compatible.
Proof. We need to prove that (Com1), (Com2), (Com3), and (Com4) hold for RH :
• Proving (Com1) means to show:
∀x ∈ PFIN(X), x ∈ x⇒ x ⊢ x R
H x.
Since R is reflexive, ∀x ∈ PFIN(X), x ∈ x ⇒ x ⊢ x R x. Thus, by (How1), we conclude
x ⊢ x RH x. Formally,
x ⊢ x R x
x ⊢ x RH x
(How1)
• Proving (Com2) means to show: ∀x ∈ PFIN(X), ∀x ∈ X− x, ∀M,N ∈ Λ⊕(x ∪ {x}),
x ∪ {x} ⊢M RH N ⇒ x ⊢ λx.M RH λx.N.
Since R is reflexive, we get x ⊢ λx.N R λx.N . Moreover, we have x ∪ {x} ⊢ M RH N by
hypothesis. Thus, by (How2), we conclude x ⊢ λx.M RH λx.N holds. Formally,
x ∪ {x} ⊢M RH N x ⊢ λx.N R λx.N x /∈ x
x ⊢ λx.M RH λx.N
(How2)
• Proving (Com3) means to show: ∀x ∈ PFIN(X), ∀M,N,L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x),
x ⊢M RH N ∧ x ⊢ L RH P ⇒ x ⊢ML RH NP.
Since R is reflexive, we get x ⊢ NP R NP . Moreover, we have x ⊢M RH N and x ⊢ L RH P
by hypothesis. Thus, by (How3), we conclude x ⊢ML RH NP holds. Formally,
x ⊢M RH N x ⊢ L RH P x ⊢ NP R NP
x ⊢ML RH NP
(How3)
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• Proving (Com4) means to show: ∀x ∈ PFIN(X), ∀M,N,L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x),
x ⊢M RH N ∧ x ⊢ L RH P ⇒ x ⊢M ⊕ L RH N ⊕ P.
Since R is reflexive, we get x ⊢ N ⊕ P R N ⊕ P . Moreover, we have x ⊢ M RH N and
x ⊢ L RH P by hypothesis. Thus, by (How4), we conclude x ⊢ M ⊕ L RH N ⊕ P holds.
Formally,
x ⊢M RH N x ⊢ L RH P x ⊢ N ⊕ P R N ⊕ P
x ⊢M ⊕ L RH N ⊕ P
(How4)
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 3.11 If R is transitive, then x ⊢M RH N and x ⊢ N R L imply x ⊢M RH L.
Proof. We prove the statement by inspection on the last rule used in the derivation of x ⊢M RH N ,
thus on the structure of M .
• If M is a variable, say x ∈ x, then x ⊢ x RH N holds by hypothesis. The last rule used has
to be (How1). Thus, we get x ⊢ x R N as additional hypothesis. By transitivity of R, from
x ⊢ x R N and x ⊢ N R L we deduce x ⊢ x R L. We conclude by (How1) on the latter,
obtaining x ⊢ x RH L, i.e. x ⊢M RH L. Formally,
x ⊢ x R N x ⊢ N R L
x ⊢ x R L
x ⊢ x RH L
(How1)
• If M is a λ-abstraction, say λx.Q, then x ⊢ λx.Q RH N holds by hypothesis. The last rule
used has to be (How2). Thus, we get x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH P and x ⊢ λx.P R N as additional
hypothesis. By transitivity of R, from x ⊢ λx.P R N and x ⊢ N R L we deduce x ⊢ λx.P R L.
We conclude by (How2) on x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH P and the latter, obtaining x ⊢ λx.Q RH L, i.e.
x ⊢M RH L. Formally,
x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH P
x ⊢ λx.P R N x ⊢ N R L
x ⊢ λx.P R L
x ⊢ λx.Q RH L
(How2)
• If M is an application, say RS, then x ⊢ RS RH N holds by hypothesis. The last rule used
has to be (How3). Thus, we get x ⊢ R RH P , x ⊢ S RH Q and x ⊢ PQ R N as additional
hypothesis. By transitivity of R, from x ⊢ PQ R N and x ⊢ N R L we deduce x ⊢ PQ R L.
We conclude by (How3) on x ⊢ R RH P , x ⊢ S RH Q and the latter, obtaining x ⊢ RS RH L,
i.e. x ⊢M RH L. Formally,
x ⊢ R RH P x ⊢ S RH Q
x ⊢ PQ R N x ⊢ N R L
x ⊢ PQ R L
x ⊢ RS RH L
(How3)
• If M is a probabilistic sum, say R⊕ S, then x ⊢ R⊕ S RH N holds by hypothesis. The last
rule used has to be (How4). Thus, we get x ⊢ R RH P , x ⊢ S RH Q and x ⊢ P ⊕Q R N as
additional hypothesis. By transitivity of R, from x ⊢ P ⊕Q R N and x ⊢ N R L we deduce
x ⊢ P ⊕Q R L. We conclude by (How4) on x ⊢ R RH P , x ⊢ S RH Q and the latter, obtaining
x ⊢ R⊕ S RH L, i.e. x ⊢M RH L. Formally,
x ⊢ R RH P x ⊢ S RH Q
x ⊢ P ⊕Q R N x ⊢ N R L
x ⊢ P ⊕Q R L
x ⊢ R⊕ S RH L
(How4)
This concludes the proof. 
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Lemma 3.12 If R is reflexive, then x ⊢M R N implies x ⊢M RH N .
Proof. We will prove it by inspection on the structure of M .
• If M is a variable, say x ∈ x, then x ⊢ x R N holds by hypothesis. We conclude by (How1) on
the latter, obtaining x ⊢ x RH N , i.e. x ⊢M RH N . Formally,
x ⊢ x R N
x ⊢ x RH N
(How1)
• If M is a λ-abstraction, say λx.Q, then x ⊢ λx.Q R N holds by hypothesis. Moreover, since
R reflexive implies RH compatible, RH is reflexive too. Then, from x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH Q and
x ⊢ λx.Q R N we conclude, by (How2), x ⊢ λx.Q RH N , i.e. x ⊢M RH N . Formally,
x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH Q x ⊢ λx.Q R N x /∈ x
x ⊢ λx.Q RH N
(How2)
• If M is an application, say LP , then x ⊢ LP R N holds by hypothesis. By reflexivity of R,
hence that of RH too, we get x ⊢ L RH L and x ⊢ P RH P . Then, from the latter and
x ⊢ LP R N we conclude, by (How3), x ⊢ LP RH N , i.e. x ⊢M RH N . Formally,
x ⊢ L RH L x ⊢ P RH P x ⊢ LP R N
x ⊢ LP RH N
(How3)
• If M is a probabilistic sum, say L⊕P , then x ⊢ L⊕P R N holds by hypothesis. By reflexivity
of R, hence that of RH too, we get x ⊢ L RH L and x ⊢ P RH P . Then, from the latter and
x ⊢ L⊕ P R N we conclude, by (How4), x ⊢ L⊕ P RH N , i.e. x ⊢M RH N . Formally,
x ⊢ L RH L x ⊢ P RH P x ⊢ L⊕ P R N
x ⊢ L⊕ P RH N
(How4)
This concludes the proof. 
Moreover, if R is a preorder and closed under term-substitution, then its lifted relation RH is
substitutive. Then, reflexivity of R implies compatibility of RH by Lemma 3.10. It follows RH
reflexive too, hence closed under term-substitution.
Lemma 3.13 If R is reflexive, transitive and closed under term-substitution, then RH is (term)
substitutive and hence also closed under term-substitution.
Proof. We show that, for all x ∈ PFIN(X), x ∈ X− x, M, N ∈ Λ⊕(x ∪ {x}) and L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x),
x ∪ {x} ⊢M RH N ∧ x ⊢ L RH P ⇒ x ⊢M{L/x} RH N{P/x}.
We prove the latter by induction on the derivation of x ∪ {x} ⊢M RH N , thus on the structure of
M .
• If M is a variable, then either M = x or M ∈ x. In the latter case, suppose M = y. Then,
by hypothesis, x ∪ {x} ⊢ y RH N holds and the only way to deduce it is by rule (How1) from
x ∪ {x} ⊢ y R N . Hence, by the fact R is closed under term-substitution and P ∈ Λ⊕(x),
we obtain x ⊢ y{P/x} R N{P/x} which is equivalent to x ⊢ y R N{P/x}. Finally, by
Lemma 3.12, we conclude x ⊢ y RH N{P/x} which is equivalent to x ⊢ y{L/x} RH N{P/x},
i.e. x ⊢M{L/x} RH N{P/x} holds. Otherwise, M = x and x∪{x} ⊢ x RH N holds. The only
way to deduce the latter is by the rule (How1) from x ∪ {x} ⊢ x R N . Hence, by the fact R
is closed under term-substitution and P ∈ Λ⊕(x), we obtain x ⊢ x{P/x} R N{P/x} which is
equivalent to x ⊢ P R N{P/x}. By Lemma 3.11, we deduce the following:
x ⊢ L RH P x ⊢ P R N{P/x}
x ⊢ L RH N{P/x}
which is equivalent to x ⊢ x{L/x} RH N{P/x}. Thus, x ⊢M{L/x} RH N{P/x} holds.
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• If M is a λ-abstraction, say λy.Q, then x ∪ {x} ⊢ λy.Q RH N holds by hypothesis. The only
way to deduce the latter is by rule (How2) as follows:
x ∪ {x, y} ⊢ Q RH R x ∪ {x} ⊢ λy.R R N x, y /∈ x
x ∪ {x} ⊢ λy.Q RH N
(How2)
Let us denote y = x ∪ {y}. Then, by induction hypothesis on y ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH R, we get
y ⊢ Q{L/x} RH R{P/x}. Moreover, by the fact R is closed under term-substitution and
P ∈ Λ⊕(x), we obtain that x ⊢ (λy.R){P/x} R N{P/x} holds, i.e. x ⊢ λy.R{P/x} R N{P/x}.
By (How2), we deduce the following:
x ∪ {y} ⊢ Q{L/x} RH R{P/x} x ⊢ λy.R{P/x} R N{P/x} y /∈ x
x ⊢ λy.Q{L/x} RH N{P/x}
(How2)
which is equivalent to x ⊢ (λy.Q){L/x} RH N{P/x}. Thus, x ⊢M{L/x} RH N{P/x} holds.
• If M is an application, say QR, then x ∪ {x} ⊢ QR RH N holds by hypothesis. The only way
to deduce the latter is by rule (How3) as follows:
x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH Q′ x ∪ {x} ⊢ R RH R′ x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q′R′ R N
x ∪ {x} ⊢ QR RH N
(How3)
By induction hypothesis on x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH Q′ and x ∪ {x} ⊢ R RH R′, we get x ⊢
Q{L/x} RH Q′{P/x} and x ⊢ R{L/x} RH R′{P/x}. Moreover, by the fact R is closed under
term-substitution and P ∈ Λ⊕(x), we obtain that x ⊢ (Q
′R′){P/x} R N{P/x} holds, i.e.
x ⊢ Q′{P/x}R′{P/x} R N{P/x}. By (How3), we deduce the following:
x ⊢ Q{L/x} RH Q′{P/x} x ⊢ R{L/x} RH R′{P/x} x ⊢ Q′{P/x}R′{P/x} R N{P/x}
x ⊢ Q{L/x}R{L/x} RH N{P/x}
(How3)
which is equivalent to x ⊢ (QR){L/x} RH N{P/x}. Thus, x ⊢M{L/x} RH N{P/x} holds.
• If M is a probabilistic sum, say Q⊕R, then x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q⊕R RH N holds by hypothesis. The
only way to deduce the latter is by rule (How4) as follows:
x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH Q′ x ∪ {x} ⊢ R RH R′ x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q′ ⊕R′ R N
x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q⊕R RH N
(How4)
By induction hypothesis on x ∪ {x} ⊢ Q RH Q′ and x ∪ {x} ⊢ R RH R′, we get x ⊢
Q{L/x} RH Q′{P/x} and x ⊢ R{L/x} RH R′{P/x}. Moreover, by the fact R is closed
under term-substitution and P ∈ Λ⊕(x), we obtain that x ⊢ (Q
′ ⊕ R′){P/x} R N{P/x}, i.e.
x ⊢ Q′{P/x} ⊕R′{P/x} R N{P/x}. By (How4), we conclude the following:
x ⊢ Q{L/x} RH Q′{P/x} x ⊢ R{L/x} RH R′{P/x} x ⊢ Q′{P/x} ⊕R′{P/x} R N{P/x}
x ⊢ Q{L/x} ⊕R{L/x} RH N{P/x}
(How4)
which is equivalent to x ⊢ (Q⊕R){L/x} RH N{P/x}. Thus, x ⊢M{L/x} RH N{P/x} holds.
This concludes the proof. 
Something is missing, however, before we can conclude that .H is a precongruence, namely
transitivity. We also follow Howe here building the transitive closure of a Λ⊕-relation R as the
relation R+ defined by the rules in Figure 4. Then, it is easy to prove R+ of being compatible and
closed under term-substitution if R is.
Lemma 3.14 If R is compatible, then so is R+.
Proof. We need to prove that (Com1), (Com2), (Com3), and (Com4) hold for R+:
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x ⊢M R N
x ⊢M R+ N
(TC1)
x ⊢M R+ N x ⊢ N R+ L
x ⊢M R+ L
(TC2)
Figure 4: Transitive Closure for Λ⊕.
• Proving (Com1) means to show:
∀x ∈ PFIN(X), x ∈ x⇒ x ⊢ x R x.
Since R is compatible, therefore reflexive, x ⊢ x R x holds. Hence x ⊢ x R+ x follows by (TC1).
• Proving (Com2) means to show: ∀x ∈ PFIN(X), ∀x ∈ X− x, ∀M,N ∈ Λ⊕(x ∪ {x}),
x ∪ {x} ⊢M R+ N ⇒ x ⊢ λx.M R+ λx.N.
We prove it by induction on the derivation of x ∪ {x} ⊢ M R+ N , looking at the last rule
used. The base case has (TC1) as last rule: thus, x ∪ {x} ⊢ M R N holds. Then, since
R is compatible, it follows x ⊢ λx.M R λx.N . We conclude applying (TC1) on the latter,
obtaining x ⊢ λx.M R+ λx.N . Otherwise, if (TC2) is the last rule used, we get that, for
some L ∈ Λ⊕(x ∪ {x}), x ∪ {x} ⊢ M R
+ L and x ∪ {x} ⊢ L R+ N hold. Then, by induction
hypothesis on both of them, we have x ⊢ λx.M R+ λx.L and x ⊢ λx.L R+ λx.N . We conclude
applying (TC2) on the latter two, obtaining x ⊢ λx.M R+ λx.N .
• Proving (Com3) means to show: ∀x ∈ PFIN(X), ∀M,N,L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x),
x ⊢M R+ N ∧ x ⊢ L R+ P ⇒ x ⊢ML R+ NP.
Firstly, we prove the following two characterizations:
∀M,N,L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x). x ⊢M R
+ N ∧ x ⊢ L R P ⇒ x ⊢ML R+ NP, (3)
∀M,N,L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x). x ⊢M R N ∧ x ⊢ L R
+ P ⇒ x ⊢ML R+ NP. (4)
In particular, we only prove (3) in details, since (4) is similarly provable. We prove (3) by
induction on the derivation x ⊢ M R+ N , looking at the last rule used. The base case has
(TC1) as last rule: we get that x ⊢M R N holds. Then, using R compatibility property and
x ⊢ L R P , it follows x ⊢ ML R NP . We conclude applying (TC1) on the latter, obtaining
x ⊢ ML R+ NP . Otherwise, if (TC2) is the last rule used, we get that, for some Q ∈ Λ⊕,
x ⊢ M R+ Q and x ⊢ Q R+ N hold. Then, by induction hypothesis on x ⊢ M R+ Q along
with x ⊢ L R P , we have x ⊢ ML R+ QP . Then, since R is compatible and so reflexive
too, x ⊢ P R P holds. By induction hypothesis on x ⊢ Q R+ N along with the latter, we
get x ⊢ QP R+ NP . We conclude applying (TC2) on x ⊢ ML R+ QP and x ⊢ QP R+ NP ,
obtaining x ⊢ML R+ NP .
Let us focus on the original (Com3) statement. We prove it by induction on the two derivations
x ⊢ M R+ N and x ⊢ L R+ P , which we name here as π and ρ respectively. Looking at
the last rules used, there are four possible cases as four are the combinations that permit to
conclude with π and ρ:
1. (TC1) for both π and ρ;
2. (TC1) for π and (TC2) for ρ;
3. (TC2) for π and (TC1) for ρ;
4. (TC2) for both π and ρ.
Observe now that the first three cases are addressed by (3) and (4). Hence, it remains to prove
the last case, where both derivations are concluded applying (TC2) rule. According to (TC2)
rule definition, we get two additional hypothesis from each derivation. In particular, for π, we
get that, for some Q ∈ Λ⊕(x), x ⊢ M R
+ Q and x ⊢ Q R+ N hold. Similarly, for ρ, we get
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that, for some R ∈ Λ⊕(x), x ⊢ L R
+ R and x ⊢ R R+ P hold. Then, by a double induction
hypothesis, firstly on x ⊢ M R+ Q, x ⊢ L R+ R and secondly on x ⊢ Q R+ N , x ⊢ R R+ P ,
we get x ⊢ ML R+ QR and x ⊢ QR R+ NP respectively. We conclude applying (TC2) on
these latter, obtaining x ⊢ML R+ NP .
• Proving (Com4) means to show: ∀x ∈ PFIN(X), ∀M,N,L, P ∈ Λ⊕(x),
x ⊢M R+ N ∧ x ⊢ L R+ P ⇒ x ⊢M ⊕ L R+ N ⊕ P.
We do not detail the proof since it boils down to that of (Com3), where partial sums play the
role of applications.
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 3.15 If R is closed under term-substitution, then so is R+.
Proof. We need to proveR+ of being closed under term-substitution: for all x ∈ PFIN(X), x ∈ X−x,
M,N ∈ Λ⊕(x ∪ {x}) and L,P ∈ Λ⊕(x),
x ∪ {x} ⊢M R+ N ∧ L ∈ Λ⊕(x)⇒ x ⊢M{L/x} R
+ N{L/x}.
We prove the latter by induction on the derivation of x ∪ {x} ⊢M R+ N , looking at the last rule
used. The base case has (TC1) as last rule: we get that x ∪ {x} ⊢M R N holds. Then, since R is
closed under term-substitution, it follows x ⊢M{L/x} R N{L/x}. We conclude applying (TC1) on
the latter, obtaining x ⊢M{L/x} R+ N{L/x}. Otherwise, if (TC2) is the last rule used, we get that,
for some P ∈ Λ⊕(x ∪ {x}), x ∪ {x} ⊢M R
+ P and x ∪ {x} ⊢ P R+ N hold. Then, by induction
hypothesis on both of them, we have x ⊢M{L/x} R+ P{L/x} and x ⊢ P{L/x} R+ N{L/x}. We
conclude applying (TC2) on the latter two, obtaining x ⊢M{L/x} R+ N{L/x}. 
It is important to note that the transitive closure of an already Howe’s lifted relation is a
preorder if the starting relation is.
Lemma 3.16 If a Λ⊕-relation R is a preorder relation, then so is (R
H)+.
Proof. We need to show (RH)+ of being reflexive and transitive. Of course, being a transitive
closure, (RH)+ is a a transitive relation. Moreover, since R is reflexive, by Lemma 3.10, RH is
reflexive too because compatible. Then, by Lemma 3.14, so is (RH)+. 
This is just the first half of the story: we also need to prove that (.H)+ is a simulation. As we
already know it is a preorder, the following lemma gives us the missing bit:
Lemma 3.17 (Key Lemma) If M .H N , then for every X ⊆ Λ⊕(x) it holds that [[M ]](λx.X) ≤
[[N ]](λx.(.H(X))).
The proof of this lemma is delicate and is discussed in the next section. From the lemma, using a
standard argument we derive the needed substitutivity results, and ultimately the most important
result of this section.
Theorem 3.18 . is a precongruence relation for Λ⊕-terms.
Proof. We prove the result by observing that (.H)+ is a precongruence and by showing that
.= (.H)+. First of all, Lemma 3.10 and Lemma 3.14 ensure that (.H)+ is compatible and
Lemma 3.16 tells us that (.H)+ is a preorder. As a consequence, (.H)+ is a precongruence.
Consider now the inclusion .⊆ (.H)+. By Lemma 3.12 and by definition of transitive closure
operator (·)+, it follows that .⊆ (.H) ⊆ (.H)+. We show the converse by proving that
(.H)+ is included in a relation R that is a call-by-name probabilistic applicative simulation,
therefore contained in the largest one. In particular, since (.H)+ is closed under term-substitution
(Lemma 3.13 and Lemma 3.15), it suffices to show the latter only on the closed version of terms
and cloned values. R acts like (.H)+ on terms, while given two cloned values νx.M and νx.N ,
(νx.M)R(νx.N) iff M(.H)+N . Since we already know that (.H)+ is a preorder (and thus R is
itself a preorder), all that remain to be checked are the following two points:
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• If M(.H)+N , then for every X ⊆ Λ⊕(x) it holds that
P⊕(M, τ, νx.X) ≤ P⊕(N, τ,R(νx.X)). (5)
Let us proceed by induction on the structure of the proof of M(.H)+N :
• The base case has (TC1) as last rule: we get that ∅ ⊢M .H N holds. Then, in particular
by Lemma 3.17,
P⊕(M, τ, νx.X) = [[M ]](λx.X)
≤ [[N ]](λx..H(X))
≤ [[N ]](λx.(.H)+(X))
≤ [[N ]](R(νx.X)) = P⊕(N, τ,R(νx.X)).
• If (TC2) is the last rule used, we obtain that, for some P ∈ Λ⊕(∅), ∅ ⊢ M (.
H)+ P and
∅ ⊢ P (.H)+ N hold. Then, by induction hypothesis, we get
P⊕(M, τ,X) ≤ P⊕(P, τ,R(X)),
P⊕(P, τ,R(X)) ≤ P⊕(N, τ,R(R(X))).
But of course R(R(X)) ⊆ R(X), and as a consequence:
P⊕(M, τ,X) ≤ P⊕(N, τ,R(X))
and (5) is satisfied.
• If M(.H)+N , then for every L ∈ Λ⊕(∅) and for every X ⊆ Λ⊕(∅) it holds that
P⊕(νx.M,L,X) ≤ P⊕(νx.N,L,R(X)).
But if M(.H)+N , then M{L/x}(.H)+N{L/x}. This is means that whenever M{L/x} ∈ X,
N{L/x} ∈ .H(X) ⊆ (.H)+(X) and ultimately
P⊕(νx.M,L,X) = 1
= P⊕(νx.N,L, (.
H)+(X))
= P⊕(νx.N,L,R(X)).
If M{L/x} /∈ X, on the other hand,
P⊕(νx.M,L,X) = 0 ≤ P⊕(νx.N,L,R(X)).
This concludes the proof. 
Corollary 3.19 ∼ is a congruence relation for Λ⊕-terms.
Proof. ∼ is an equivalence relation by definition, in particular a symmetric relation. Since
∼=. ∩ .op by Proposition 2.13, ∼ is also compatible as a consequence of Theorem 3.18. 
3.2 Proof of the Key Lemma
As we have already said, Lemma 3.17 is indeed a crucial step towards showing that probabilistic
applicative simulation is a precongruence. Proving the Key Lemma 3.17 turns out to be much
more difficult than for deterministic or nondeterministic cases. In particular, the case when M
is an application relies on another technical lemma we are now going to give, which itself can be
proved by tools from linear programming.
The combinatorial problem we will face while proving the Key Lemma can actually be decon-
textualized and understood independently. Suppose we have n = 3 non-disjoint sets X1, X2, X3
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Figure 5: Disentangling Sets
whose elements are labelled with real numbers. As an example, we could be in a situation like
the one in Figure 5(a) (where for the sake of simplicity only the labels are indicated). We fix
three real numbers p1
def
= 564 , p2
def
= 316 , p3
def
= 564 . It is routine to check that for every I ⊆ {1, 2, 3}
it holds that ∑
i∈I
pi ≤ ||
⋃
i∈I
Xi||,
where ||X|| is the sum of the labels of the elements of X. Let us observe that it is of course possible
to turn the three sets X1, X2, X3 into three disjoint sets Y1, Y2 and Y3 where each Yi contains
(copies of) the elements of Xi whose labels, however, are obtained by splitting the ones of the
original elements. Examples of those sets are in Figure 5(b): if you superpose the three sets, you
obtain the Venn diagram we started from. Quite remarkably, however, the examples from Figure 5
have an additional property, namely that for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3} it holds that pi ≤ ||Yi||. We now
show that finding sets satisfying the properties above is always possible, even when n is arbitrary.
Suppose p1, . . . , pn ∈ R[0,1], and suppose that for each I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} a real number rI ∈
R[0,1] is defined such that for every such I it holds that
∑
i∈I pi ≤
∑
J∩I 6=∅ rJ ≤ 1. Then
({pi}1≤i≤n, {rI}I⊆{1,...,n}) is said to be a probability assignment for {1, . . . , n}. Is it always possible
to “disentangle” probability assignments? The answer is positive.
The following is a formulation of Max-Flow-Min-Cut Theorem:
Theorem 3.20 (Max-Flow-Min-Cut) For any flow network, the value of the maximum flow is
equal to the capacity of the minimum cut.
Lemma 3.21 (Disentangling Probability Assignments) Let P
def
= ({pi}1≤i≤n, {rI}I⊆{1,...,n})
be a probability assignment. Then for every nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and for every k ∈ I there is
sk,I ∈ R[0,1] such that the following conditions all hold:
1. for every I, it holds that
∑
k∈I sk,I ≤ 1;
2. for every k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it holds that pk ≤
∑
k∈I sk,I · rI .
Proof. For every probability assignment P, let us define the flow network of P as the digraph
NP
def
= (VP, EP) where:
• VP
def
= (P({1, . . . , n})−∅)∪ {s, t}, where s, t are a distinguished source and target, respectively;
• EP is composed by three kinds of edges:
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• (s, {i}) for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, with an assigned capacity of pi;
• (I, I ∪ {i}), for every nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and i 6∈ I, with an assigned capacity of 1;
• (I, t), for every nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, with an assigned capacity of rI .
We prove the following two lemmas on NP which together entail the result.
• Lemma 3.22 If NP admits a flow summing to
∑
i∈{1,...,n} pi, then the sk,I exist for which
conditions 1. and 2. hold.
Proof. Let us fix p
def
=
∑
i∈{1,...,n} pi. The idea then is to start with a flow of value p in input
to the source s, which by hypothesis is admitted by NP and the maximum one can get, and
split it into portions going to singleton vertices {i}, for every i ∈ I, each of value pi. Afterwards,
for every other vertex I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, values of flows on the incoming edges are summed up
and then distributed to the outgoing adges as one wishes, thanks to conservation property of
the flow. Formally, a flow f : Ep → R[0,1] is turned into a function f : Ep → (R[0,1])
n defined as
follows:
• For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, f (s,{i})
def
= (0, . . . , f(s,{i}), . . . , 0), where the only possibly nonnull
component is exactly the i-th;
• For every nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, as soon as f has been defined on all ingoing edges of I,
we can define it on all its outgoing ones, by just splitting each component as we want. This
is possible, of course, because f is a flow and, as such, ingoing and outgoing values are the
same. More formally, let us fix f (∗,I)
def
=
∑
K⊆{1,...,n} f (K,I) and indicate with f (∗,I),k its
k-th component. Then, for every i 6∈ I, we set f (I,I∪{i})
def
= (q1,i · f (∗,I),1, . . . , qn,i · f (∗,I),n)
where, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, qj,i ∈ R[0,1] are such that
∑
i 6∈I qj,i · f (∗,I),j = f (∗,I),j and∑n
j=1 qj,i · f (∗,I),j = f(I,I∪{i}). Of course, a similar definition can be given to f (I,t), for
every nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}.
Notice that, the way we have just defined f guarantees that the sum of all components of fe is
always equal to fe, for every e ∈ EP. Now, for every nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, fix sk,I to be the
ratio qk of f (I,t); i.e., the k-th component of f (I,t) (or 0 if the first is itself 0). On the one hand,
for every nonempty I ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
∑
k∈I sk,I is obviously less or equal to 1, hence condition 1.
holds. On the other, each component of f is itself a flow, since it satisfies the capacity and
conservation constraints. Moreover, NP is structured in such a way that the k-th component of
f (I,t) is 0 whenever k 6∈ I. As a consequence, since f satisfies the capacity constraint, for every
k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
pk ≤
∑
k∈I
sk,I · f (I,t) ≤
∑
k∈I
sk,I · rI
and so condition 2. holds too. 
• Lemma 3.23 NP admits a flow summing to
∑
i∈I pi.
Proof. We prove the result by means of Theorem 3.20. In particular, we just prove that the
capacity of any cut must be at least p
def
=
∑
i∈{1,...,n} pi. A cut (S,A) is said to be degenerate
if there are I ⊆ {1, . . . , n} and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that I ∈ S and I ∪ {i} ∈ A. It is easy to
verify that every degenerate cut has capacity greater or equal to 1, thus greater or equal to p.
As a consequence, we can just concentrate on non-degenerate cuts and prove that all of them
have capacity at least p. Given two cuts C
def
= (S,A) and D
def
= (T,B), we say that C ≤ D iff
S ≤ T . Then, given I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, we call I-cut any cut (S,A) such that
⋃
{i}∈S{i} = I. The
canonical I-cut is the unique I-cut CI
def
= (S,A) such that S = {s}∪{J ⊆ {1, . . . , n} | J ∩I 6= ∅}.
Please observe that, by definition, CI is non-degenerate and that the capacity c(CI) of CI is at
least p, because the forward edges in CI (those connecting elements of S to those of A) are
those going from s to the singletons not in S, plus the edges going from any J ∈ S to t. The
sum of the capacities of such edges are greater or equal to p by hypothesis. We now need to
prove the following two lemmas.
• Lemma 3.24 For every non-degenerate I-cuts C,D such that C > D, there is a non-
degenerate I-cut E such that C ≥ E > D and c(E) ≥ c(D).
Proof. Let C
def
= (S,A) and D
def
= (T,B). Moreover, let J be any element of S\T . Then,
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consider E
def
= (T ∪ {K ⊆ {1, . . . , n} | J ⊆ K}, B\{K ⊆ {1, . . . , n} | J ⊆ K}) and verify that
E is the cut we are looking for. Indeed, E is non-degenerate because it is obtained from D,
which is non-degenerate by hypothesis, by adding to it J and all its supersets. Of course,
E > D. Moreover, C ≥ E holds since J ∈ S and C is non-degenerate, which implies C
contains all supersets of J as well. It is also easy to check that c(E) ≥ c(D). In fact, in the
process of constructing E from D we do not lose any forward edges coming from s, since
J cannot be a singleton with C and D both I-cuts, or any other edge coming from some
element of T , since D is non-degenerate. 
• Lemma 3.25 For every non-degenerate I-cuts C,D such that C ≥ D, c(C) ≥ c(D).
Proof. Let C
def
= (S,A) and D
def
= (T,B). We prove the result by induction on the
n
def
= |S| − |T |. If n = 0, then C = D and the thesis follows. If n > 0, then C > D and, by
Lemma 3.24, there is a non-degenerate I-cut E such that C ≥ E > D and c(E) ≥ c(D). By
induction hypothesis on C and E, it follows that c(C) ≥ c(E). Thus, c(C) ≥ c(D). 
The two lemmas above permit to conclude. Indeed, for every non-degenerate cut D, there is
of course a I such that D is a I-cut (possibly with I as the empty set). Then, let us consider
the canonical CI . On the one hand, c(CI) ≥ p. On the other, since CI is non-degenerate,
c(D) ≥ c(CI) by Lemma 3.25. Hence, c(D) ≥ p. 
This concludes the main proof. 
In the coming proof of Lemma 3.17 we will widely, and often implicitly, use the following technical
Lemmas. We denote with νx. . (X) the set of distinguished values {νx.M | ∃N ∈ X.N .M}.
Lemma 3.26 For every X ⊆ Λ⊕(x), . (νx.X) = νx. . (X).
Proof.
νx.M ∈. (νx.X)⇔ ∃N ∈ X. νx.N . νx.M
⇔ ∃N ∈ X.N .M
⇔ νx.M ∈ νx. . (X).
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 3.27 If M . N , then for every X ∈ Λ⊕(x), [[M ]](λx.X) ≤ [[N ]](λx. . (X)).
Proof. If M . N , then by definition [[M ]](νx.X) ≤ [[N ]](. (νx.X)). Therefore, by Lemma 3.26,
[[N ]](. (νx.X)) ≤ [[N ]](νx. . (X)). 
Remark 3.28 Throughout the following proof we will implicitly use a routine result stating that
M . N implies [[M ]](λx.X) ≤ [[N ]](λx..(X)), for every X ⊆ Λ⊕(x). The property needed by the
latter is precisely the reason why we have formulated Λ⊕ as a multisorted labelled Markov chain:
.(νx.X) consists of distinguished values only, and is nothing but νx..(X).
Proof. [of Lemma 3.17] This is equivalent to proving that if M .H N , then for every X ⊆ Λ⊕(x)
the following implication holds: ifM ⇓ D , then D(λx.X) ≤ [[N ]](λx.(.H(X))). This is an induction
on the structure of the proof of M ⇓ D .
• If D = ∅, then of course D(λx.X) = 0 ≤ [[N ]](λx.Y ) for every X,Y ⊆ Λ⊕(x).
• If M is a value λx.L and D(λx.L) = 1, then the proof of M .H N necessarily ends as follows:
{x} ⊢ L .H P ∅ ⊢ λx.P . N
∅ ⊢ λx.L .H N
Let X be any subset of Λ⊕(x). Now, if L 6∈ X, then D(λx.X) = 0 and the inequality trivially
holds. If, on the contrary, L ∈ X, then P ∈ .H(X). Consider . (P ), the set of terms that
are in relation with P via .. We have that for every Q ∈ . (P ), both {x} ⊢ L .H P and
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{x} ⊢ P . Q hold, and as a consequence {x} ⊢ L .H Q does (this is a consequence of a
property of (·)H , see [9]). In other words, . (P ) ⊆ .H(X). But then, by Lemma 3.27,
[[N ]](λx..H(X)) ≥ [[N ]](λx. . (P )) ≥ [[λx.P ]](λx.P ) = 1.
• If M is an application LP , then M ⇓ D is obtained as follows:
L ⇓ F {Q{P/x} ⇓ HQ,P }Q,P
LP ⇓
∑
Q F (λx.Q) ·HQ,P
Moreover, the proof of ∅ ⊢M .H N must end as follows:
∅ ⊢ L .H R ∅ ⊢ P .H S ∅ ⊢ RS . N
∅ ⊢ LP .H N
Now, since L ⇓ F and ∅ ⊢ L .H R, by induction hypothesis we get that for every Y ⊆ Λ⊕(x)
it holds that F (λx.Y ) ≤ [[R]](λx..H(Y )). Let us now take a look at the distribution
D =
∑
Q
F (λx.Q) ·HQ,P .
Since F is a finite distribution, the sum above is actually the sum of finitely many summands.
Let the support S(F ) of F be {λx.Q1, . . . , λx.Qn}. It is now time to put the above into a form
that is amenable to treatment by Lemma 3.21. Let us consider the n sets .H(Q1), . . . ,.
H(Qn);
to each term U in them we can associate the probability [[R]](λx.U). We are then in the scope
of Lemma 3.21, since by induction hypothesis we know that for every Y ⊆ Λ⊕(x),
F (λx.X) ≤ [[R]](λx..H(X)).
We can then conclude that for every
U ∈ .H({Q1, . . . , Qn}) =
⋃
1≤i≤n
.
H(Qi)
there are n real numbers rU,R1 , . . . , r
U,R
n such that:
[[R]](λx.U) ≥
∑
1≤i≤n
rU,Ri ∀U ∈
⋃
1≤i≤n
.
H(Qi);
F (λx.Qi) ≤
∑
U∈.H(Qi)
rU,Ri ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
So, we can conclude that
D ≤
∑
1≤i≤n

 ∑
U∈.H(Qi)
rU,Ri

 ·HQi,P
=
∑
1≤i≤n
∑
U∈.H(Qi)
rU,Ri ·HQi,P .
Now, whenever Qi.
HU and P.HS, we know that, by Lemma 3.13, Qi{P/x}.
HU{S/x}. We
can then apply the inductive hypothesis to the n derivations of Qi{P/x} ⇓ HQi,P , obtaining
23
that, for every X ⊆ Λ⊕(x),
D(λx.X) ≤
∑
1≤i≤n
∑
U∈.H (Qi)
rU,Ri · [[U{
S/x}]](λx..H(X))
≤
∑
1≤i≤n
∑
U∈.H ({Q1,...,Qn})
rU,Ri · [[U{
S/x}]](λx..H(X))
=
∑
U∈.H ({Q1,...,Qn})
∑
1≤i≤n
rU,Ri · [[U{
S/x}]](λx..H(X))
=
∑
U∈.H ({Q1,...,Qn})

 ∑
1≤i≤n
rU,Ri

 · [[U{S/x}]](λx..H(X))
≤
∑
U∈.H ({Q1,...,Qn})
[[R]](λx.U) · [[U{S/x}]](λx..H(X))
≤
∑
U∈Λ⊕(x)
[[R]](λx.U) · [[U{S/x}]](λx..H(X))
= [[RS]](λx..H(X)) ≤ [[N ]](λx. . ((.H)(X)))
≤ [[N ]](λx..H(X)),
which is the thesis.
• If M is a probabilistic sum L⊕ P , then M ⇓ D is obtained as follows:
L ⇓ F P ⇓ G
L⊕ P ⇓ 12 ·F +
1
2 · G
Moreover, the proof of ∅ ⊢M .H N must end as follows:
∅ ⊢ L .H R ∅ ⊢ P .H S ∅ ⊢ R⊕ S . N
∅ ⊢ L⊕ P .H N
Now:
• Since L ⇓ F and ∅ ⊢ L .H R, by induction hypothesis we get that for every Y ⊆ Λ⊕(x) it
holds that F (λx.Y ) ≤ [[R]](λx..H(Y ));
• Similarly, since P ⇓ G and ∅ ⊢ P .H S, by induction hypothesis we get that for every
Y ⊆ Λ⊕(x) it holds that G (λx.Y ) ≤ [[S]](λx..
H(Y )).
Let us now take a look at the distribution
D =
1
2
·F +
1
2
· G .
The idea then is to prove that, for every X ⊆ Λ⊕(x), it holds D(λx.X) ≤ [[R⊕ S]](λx..
H(X)).
In fact, since [[R ⊕ S]](λx..H(X)) ≤ [[N ]](λx..H(X)), the latter would imply the thesis
D(λx.X) ≤ [[N ]](λx..H(X)). But by induction hypothesis and Lemma 2.3:
D(λx.X) =
1
2
·F (λx.X) +
1
2
· G (λx.X)
≤
1
2
· [[R]](λx..H(X)) +
1
2
· [[S]](λx..H(X))
= [[R⊕ S]](λx..H(X)).
This concludes the proof. 
3.3 Context Equivalence
We now formally introduce probabilistic context equivalence and prove it to be coarser than
probabilistic applicative bisimilarity.
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Definition 3.29 A Λ⊕-term context is a syntax tree with a unique “hole” [·], generated as follows:
C,D ∈ CΛ⊕ ::= [·] |λx.C |CM |MC |C ⊕M |M ⊕ C.
We denote with C[N ] the Λ⊕-term that results from filling the hole with a Λ⊕-term N :
[·][N ]
def
= N ;
(λx.C)[N ]
def
= λx.C[N ];
(CM)[N ]
def
= C[N ]M ;
(MC)[N ]
def
= MC[N ];
(C ⊕M)[N ]
def
= C[N ]⊕M ;
(M ⊕ C)[N ]
def
= M ⊕ C[N ].
We also write C[D] for the context resulting from replacing the occurrence of [·] in the syntax tree
C by the tree D.
We continue to keep track of free variables by sets x of variables and we inductively define
subsets CΛ⊕(x ; y) of contexts by the following rules:
[·] ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; x)
(Ctx1)
C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y ∪ {x}) x 6∈ y
λx.C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y)
(Ctx2)
C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y) M ∈ Λ⊕(y)
CM ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y)
(Ctx3)
M ∈ Λ⊕(y) C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y)
MC ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y)
(Ctx4)
C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y) M ∈ Λ⊕(y)
C ⊕M ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y)
(Ctx5)
M ∈ Λ⊕(y) C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y)
M ⊕ C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y)
(Ctx6)
We use double indexing over x and y to indicate the sets of free variables before and after the
filling of the hole by a term. The two following properties explain this idea.
Lemma 3.30 If M ∈ Λ⊕(x) and C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y), then C[M ] ∈ Λ⊕(y).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y) from the rules (Ctx1)-(Ctx6). 
Lemma 3.31 If C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y) and D ∈ CΛ⊕(y ; y), then D[C] ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y).
Proof. By induction on the derivation of D ∈ CΛ⊕(y ; y) from the rules (Ctx1)-(Ctx6). 
Let us recall here the definition of context preorder and equivalence.
Definition 3.32 The probabilistic context preorder with respect to call-by-name evaluation is the
Λ⊕-relation given by x ⊢M ≤⊕ N iff ∀C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; ∅), C[M ]⇓p implies C[N ]⇓q with p ≤ q. The
Λ⊕-relation of probabilistic context equivalence, denoted x ⊢M ≃⊕ N , holds iff x ⊢M ≤⊕ N and
x ⊢ N ≤⊕ M do.
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Lemma 3.33 The context preorder ≤⊕ is a precongruence relation.
Proof. Proving ≤⊕ being a precongruence relation means to prove it transitive and compatible. We
start by proving ≤⊕ being transitive, that is, for every x ∈ PFIN(X) and for everyM, N, L ∈ Λ⊕(x),
x ⊢ M ≤⊕ N and x ⊢ N ≤⊕ L imply x ⊢ M ≤⊕ L. By Definition 3.32, the latter boils down to
prove that, the following hypotheses
• For every C, C[M ]⇓p implies C[N ]⇓q, with p ≤ q;
• For every C, C[N ]⇓p implies C[L]⇓q, with p ≤ q,
• D[M ]⇓r
imply D[L]⇓s, with r ≤ s. We can easily apply the first hypothesis when C is just D, then
the second hypothesis (again with C equal to D), and get the thesis. We prove ≤⊕ of being a
compatible relation starting from (Com2) property because (Com1) is trivially valid. In particular,
we must show that, for every x ∈ PFIN(X), for every x ∈ X−{x} and for everyM, N ∈ Λ⊕(x∪{x}),
if x ∪ {x} ⊢M ≤⊕ N then x ⊢ λx.M ≤⊕ λx.N . By Definition 3.32, the latter boils down to prove
that, the following hypotheses
• For every C, C[M ]⇓p implies C[N ]⇓q, with p ≤ q,
• D[λx.M ]⇓r
imply D[λx.N ]⇓s, with r ≤ s. Since D ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; ∅), let us consider the context λx.[·] ∈
CΛ⊕(x∪{x} ; x). Then, by Lemma 3.31, the context E of the form D[λx.[·]] is in CΛ⊕(x∪{x} ; ∅).
Please note that, by Definition 3.29, D[λx.M ] = E[M ] and, therefore, the second hypothesis can
be rewritten as E[M ]⇓r. Thus, it follows that E[N ]⇓s, with r ≤ s. Moreover, observe that E[N ] is
nothing else than D[λx.N ]. Since we have just proved ≤⊕ of being transitive, we prove (Com3)
property by showing that (Com3L) and (Com3R) hold. In fact, recall that by Lemma 3.8, the
latter two, together, imply the former. In particular, to prove (Com3L) we must show that, for
every x ∈ PFIN(X) and for every M, N, L ∈ Λ⊕(x), if x ⊢ M ≤⊕ N then x ⊢ ML ≤⊕ NL. By
Definition 3.32, the latter boils down to prove that, the following hypothesis
• For every C, C[M ]⇓p implies C[N ]⇓q, with p ≤ q,
• D[ML]⇓r
imply D[NL]⇓s, with r ≤ s. Since D ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; ∅), let us consider the context [·]L ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; x).
Then, by Lemma 3.31, the context E of the form D[[·]L] is in CΛ⊕(x ; ∅). Please note that, by
Definition 3.29, D[ML] = E[M ] and, therefore, the second hypothesis can be rewritten as E[M ]⇓r.
Thus, it follows that E[N ]⇓s, with r ≤ s. Moreover, observe that E[N ] is nothing else than
D[λx.N ]. We do not detail the proof for (Com3R) that follows the reasoning made for (Com3L),
but considering E as the context D[L[·]]. Proving (Com4) follows the same pattern resulted for
(Com3). In fact, by Lemma 3.9, (Com4L) and (Com4R) together imply (Com4). We do not detail
the proofs since they proceed the reasoning made for (Com3L), considering the appropriate context
each time. This concludes the proof. 
Corollary 3.34 The context equivalence ≃⊕ is a congruence relation.
Proof. Straightforward consequence of the definition ≃⊕ = ≤⊕ ∩ ≤⊕
op . 
Lemma 3.35 Let R be a compatible Λ⊕-relation. If x ⊢ M R N and C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y), then
y ⊢ C[M ] R C[N ].
Proof. By induction on the derivation of C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y):
• If C is due to (Ctx1) then C = [·]. Thus, C[M ] =M , C[N ] = N and the result trivially holds.
• If (Ctx2) is the last rule used, then C = λx.D, with D ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y ∪ {x}). By induction
hypothesis, it holds that y ∪ {x} ⊢ D[M ] R D[N ]. Since R is a compatible relation, it follows
y ⊢ λx.D[M ] R λx.D[N ], that is y ⊢ C[M ] R C[N ].
• If (Ctx3) is the last rule used, then C = DL, with D ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y) and L ∈ Λ⊕(y). By induction
hypothesis, it holds that y ⊢ D[M ] R D[N ]. Since R is a compatible relation, it follows
y ⊢ D[M ]L R D[N ]L, which by definition means y ⊢ (DL)[M ] R (DL)[N ]. Hence, the result
y ⊢ C[M ] R C[N ] holds. The case of rule (Ctx4) holds by a similar reasoning.
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• If (Ctx5) is the last rule used, then C = D ⊕ L, with D ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y) and L ∈ Λ⊕(y). By
induction hypothesis, it holds that y ⊢ D[M ] R D[N ]. Since R is a compatible relation, it
follows y ⊢ D[M ]⊕ L R D[N ]⊕ L, which by definition means y ⊢ (D ⊕ L)[M ] R (D ⊕ L)[N ].
Hence, the result y ⊢ C[M ] R C[N ] holds. The case of rule (Ctx6) holds by a similar reasoning.
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 3.36 If x ⊢M ∼ N and C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y), then y ⊢ C[M ] ∼ C[N ].
Proof. Since ∼=. ∩ .op by Proposition 2.13, x ⊢ M ∼ N implies x ⊢ M . N and
x ⊢ N . M . Since, by Theorem 3.18, . is a precongruence hence a compatible relation,
y ⊢ C[M ] . C[N ] and y ⊢ C[N ] . C[M ] follow by Lemma 3.35, i.e. y ⊢ C[M ] ∼ C[N ]. 
Theorem 3.37 For all x ∈ PFIN(X) and every M, N ∈ Λ⊕(x), x ⊢M ∼ N implies x ⊢M ≃⊕ N .
Proof. If x ⊢M ∼ N , then for every C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; ∅), ∅ ⊢ C[M ] ∼ C[N ] follows by Lemma 3.36.
By Lemma 3.5, the latter implies
∑
[[C[M ]]] = p =
∑
[[C[N ]]]. This means in particular that
C[M ]⇓p iff C[N ]⇓p, which is equivalent to x ⊢M ≃⊕ N by definition. 
The converse inclusion fails. A counterexample is described in the following.
Example 3.38 ForM
def
= λx.L⊕P and N
def
= (λx.L)⊕(λx.P ) (where L is λy.Ω and P is λy.λz.Ω),
we have M 6. N , hence M 6∼ N , but M≃⊕N .
We prove that the above two terms are context equivalent by means of CIU-equivalence. This is
a relation that can be shown to coincide with context equivalence by a Context Lemma, itself
proved by the Howe’s technique. See Section 4 and Section 5 for supplementary details on the
above counterexample.
4 Context Free Context Equivalence
We present here a way of treating the problem of too concrete representations of contexts: right
now, we cannot basically work up-to α-equivalence classes of contexts. Let us dispense with
them entirely, and work instead with a coinductive characterization of the context preorder, and
equivalence, phrased in terms of Λ⊕-relations.
Definition 4.1 A Λ⊕-relation R is said to be adequate if, for every M, N ∈ Λ⊕(∅), ∅ ⊢M R N
implies M⇓p and N⇓q, with p ≤ q.
Let us indicate with CA the collection of all compatible and adequate Λ⊕-relations and let
≤ca⊕
def
=
⋃
CA. (6)
It turns out that the context preorder ≤⊕ is the largest Λ⊕-relation that is both compatible and
adequate, that is ≤⊕ = ≤
ca
⊕ . Let us proceed towards a proof for the latter.
Lemma 4.2 For every R, T ∈ CA, R ◦ T ∈ CA.
Proof. We need to show that R ◦ T = {(M,N) | ∃L ∈ Λ⊕(x). x ⊢ M R L ∧ x ⊢ L T N} is a
compatible and adequate Λ⊕-relation. Obviously, R ◦ T is adequate: for every (M,N) ∈ R ◦ T ,
there exists a term L such that M⇓p ⇒ L⇓q ⇒ N⇓r, with p ≤ q ≤ r. Then, M⇓p ⇒ N⇓r, with
p ≤ r. Note that the identity relation ID
def
= {(M,M) |M ∈ Λ⊕(x)} is in R ◦ T . Then, R ◦ T is
reflexive and, in particular, satisfies compatibility property (Com1). Proving (Com2) means to
show that, if x ∪ {x} ⊢ M (R ◦ T ) N , then x ⊢ λx.M (R ◦ T ) λx.N . From the hypothesis, it
follows that there exists a term L such that x∪ {x} ⊢M R L and x∪ {x} ⊢ L T N . Since both R
and T are in CA, hence compatible, it holds x ⊢ λx.M R λx.L and x ⊢ λx.L T λx.N . The latter
27
together imply x ⊢ λx.M (R◦ T ) λx.N . Proving (Com3) means to show that, if x ⊢M (R◦ T ) N
and x ⊢ Q (R ◦ T ) R, then x ⊢MQ (R ◦ T ) NR. From the hypothesis, it follows that there exist
two terms L, P such that, on the one hand, x ⊢M R L and x ⊢ L T N , and on the other hand,
x ⊢ Q R P and x ⊢ P T R. Since both R and T are in CA, hence compatible, it holds:
x ⊢M R L ∧ x ⊢ Q R P ⇒ x ⊢MQ R LP ;
x ⊢ L T N ∧ x ⊢ P T R⇒ x ⊢ LP T NR.
The two together imply x ⊢MQ (R ◦ T ) NR.
Proceeding in the same fashion, one can easily prove property (Com4). 
Lemma 4.3 Λ⊕-relation ≤
ca
⊕ is adequate.
Proof. It suffices to note that the property of being adequate is closed under taking unions of
relations. Indeed, if R, T are adequate relations, then it is easy to see that the union R∪T is: for
every couple (M,N) ∈ R ∪ T , either x ⊢M R N or x ⊢M T N . Either way, M⇓p ⇒ N⇓q, with
p ≤ q, implying R∪ T of being adequate. 
Lemma 4.4 Λ⊕-relation ≤
ca
⊕ is a precongruence.
Proof. We need to show that ≤ca⊕ is a transitive and compatible relation. By Lemma 4.2,
≤ca⊕ ◦≤
ca
⊕ ⊆ ≤
ca
⊕ which implies ≤
ca
⊕ of being transitive. Let us now prove that ≤
ca
⊕ is also compatible.
Note that the identity relation ID = {(M,M) |M ∈ Λ⊕(x)} is in CA, which implies reflexivity
of ≤ca⊕ and hence, in particular, it satisfies property (Com1). It is clear that property (Com2) is
closed under taking unions of relations, so that ≤ca⊕ satisfies (Com2) too. The same is not true
for properties (Com3) and (Com4). By Lemma 3.8 (respectively, Lemma 3.9), for (Com3) (resp.,
(Com4)) it suffices to show that ≤ca⊕ satisfies (Com3L) and (Com3R) (resp., (Com4L) and (Com4R)).
This is obvious: contrary to (Com3) (resp., (Com4)), these properties clearly are closed under
taking unions of relations.
This concludes the proof. 
Corollary 4.5 ≤ca⊕ is the largest compatible and adequate Λ⊕-relation.
Proof. Straightforward consequence of Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4. 
Lemma 4.6 Λ⊕-relations ≤⊕ and ≤
ca
⊕ coincide.
Proof. By Definition 3.32, it is immediate that ≤⊕ is adequate. Moreover, by Lemma 3.33,
≤⊕ is a precongruence. Therefore ≤⊕ ∈ CA implying ≤⊕ ⊆ ≤
ca
⊕ . Let us prove the converse.
Since, by Lemma 4.4, ≤ca⊕ is a precongruence hence a compatible relation, it holds that, for every
M, N ∈ Λ⊕(x) and for every C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; y), x ⊢M ≤
ca
⊕ N implies y ⊢ C[M ] ≤
ca
⊕ C[N ]. Therefore,
for every M, N ∈ Λ⊕(x) and for every C ∈ CΛ⊕(x ; ∅),
x ⊢M ≤ca⊕ N ⇒ ∅ ⊢ C[M ] ≤
ca
⊕ C[N ]
which implies, by the fact that ≤ca⊕ is adequate,
C[M ]⇓p ⇒ C[N ]⇓q, with p ≤ q
that is, by Definition 3.32,
x ⊢M ≤⊕ N.
This concludes the proof. 
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5 CIU-Equivalence
CIU-equivalence is a simpler characterization of that kind of program equivalence we are interested
in, i.e., context equivalence. In fact, we will prove that the two notions coincide. While context
equivalence envisages a quantification over all contexts, CIU-equivalence relaxes such constraint to
a restricted class of contexts without affecting the associated notion of program equivalence. Such
a class of contexts is that of evaluation contexts. In particular, we use a different representation of
evaluation contexts, seeing them as a stack of evaluation frames.
Definition 5.1 The set of frame stacks is given by the following set of rules:
S,T ::= nil | [·]M :: S.
The set of free variables of a frame stack S can be easily defined as the union of the variables
occurring free in the terms embedded into it. Given a set of variables x, define FS(x) as the set
of frame stacks whose free variables are all from x. Given a frame stack S ∈ FS(x) and a term
M ∈ Λ⊕(x), we define the term ES(M) ∈ Λ⊕(x) as follows:
Enil(M)
def
= M ;
E[·]M ::S(N)
def
= ES(NM).
We now define a binary relation  n between pairs of the form (S,M) and sequences of pairs in
the same form:
(S,MN) n ([·]N :: S,M);
(S,M ⊕N) n (S,M), (S, N);
([·]M :: S, λx.N) n (S, N{M/x}).
Finally, we define a formal system whose judgments are in the form (S,M) ↓pn and whose rules are
as follows:
(S,M) ↓0n
(empty)
(nil, V ) ↓1n
(value)
(S,M) n (T1, N1), . . . , (Tn, Nn) (Ti, Ni) ↓
pi
n
(S,M) ↓
1
n
∑
n
i=1
pi
n
(term)
The expression C(S,M) stands for the real number supp∈R(S,M) ↓
p
n.
Lemma 5.2 For all closed frame stacks S ∈ FS(∅) and closed Λ⊕-terms M ∈ Λ⊕(∅), C(S,M) = p
iff ES(M)⇓p. In particular, M⇓p holds iff C(nil,M) = p.
Proof. First of all, we recall here that the work of Dal Lago and Zorzi [10] provides various
call-by-name inductive semantics, either big-steps or small-steps, which are all equivalent. Then,
the result can be deduced from the following properties:
1. For all S ∈ FS(∅), if (S,M) ↓pn then ∃D . ES(M)⇒IN D with
∑
D = p.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of (S,M) ↓pn, looking at the last rule used.
• (empty) rule used: (S,M) ↓0n. Then, consider the empty distribution D
def
= ∅ and observe
that ES(M)⇒IN D by sen rule.
• (value) rule used: (S,M) ↓1n implies S = nil and M of being a value, say V . Then,
consider the distribution D
def
= {V 1} and observe that Enil(V ) = V ⇒IN D by svn rule.
Of course,
∑
D = 1 = p.
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• (term) rule used: (S,M) ↓
1
n
∑
n
i=1
pi
n obtained from (S,M) n (T1, N1), . . . , (Tn, Nn) and,
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (Ti, Ni) ↓
pi
n . Then, by induction hypothesis, there exist E1, . . . ,En
such that ETi(Ni)⇒IN Ei with
∑
Ei = pi.
Let us now proceed by cases according to the structure of M .
• If M = λx.L, then S = [·]P :: T implying n = 1, T1 = T and N1 = L{P/x}.
Then, consider the distribution D
def
= E1 and observe that ES(M) = E[·]P ::T(λx.L) =
ET((λx.L)P ) 7→n ET(L{P/x}) = ET1(N1). Hence, ES(M) ⇒IN D by smn rule.
Moreover,
∑
D =
∑
E1 = p1 =
1
n
∑n
i=1 pi = p.
• If M = L ⊕ P , then n = 2, T1 = T2 = S, N1 = L and N2 = P . Then, con-
sider the distribution D
def
=
∑2
i=1
1
2Ei and observe that ES(M) = ES(L ⊕ P ) 7→n
ES(L), ES(P ) = ET1(N1), ET2(N2). Hence, ES(M) ⇒IN D by smn rule. Moreover,∑
D =
∑∑2
i=1
1
2Ei =
1
2
∑2
i=1
∑
Ei =
1
2
∑2
i=1 pi = p.
• If M = LP , then n = 1, T1 = [·]P :: S and N1 = L. Then, consider the distribution
D
def
= E1 and observe that E[·]P ::S(L) ⇒IN E1 implies ES(M) ⇒IN D . Moreover,∑
D =
∑
E1 = p1 =
1
n
∑n
i=1 pi = p.
This concludes the proof. 
2. For all D , if M ⇒IN D then ∃S, N. ES(N) =M and (S, N) ↓
p
n with
∑
D = p.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of M ⇒IN D , looking at the last rule used. (We
refer here to the inductive schema of inference rules gave in [10] for small-step call-by-name
semantics of Λ⊕.)
• sen rule used: M ⇒IN ∅. Then, for every S and every N such that ES(N) =M , (S, N) ↓
0
n
by (empty) rule. Of course,
∑
D = 0 = p.
• svn rule used: M is a value, say V , and D = {V
1} with V ⇒IN {V
1}. Then, consider
S
def
= nil and N
def
= V : by definition ES(N) = Enil(V ) = V = M . By (value) rule,
(nil, V ) ↓1n hence
∑
D = 1 = p.
• svn rule used: M ⇒IN
∑n
i=1
1
nEi from M 7→n Q1, . . . , Qn with, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Qi ⇒IN Ei. By induction hypothesis, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there exist Ti and Ni such
that ETi(Ni) = Qi and (Ti, Ni) ↓
pi
n with
∑
Ei = pi.
Let us proceed by cases according to the structure of M .
• If M = (λx.L)P , then n = 1 and Q1 = L{P/x}. Hence, consider S
def
= [·]P :: nil and
N
def
= λx.L: by definition, ES(N) = E[·]P ::nil(λx.L) = Enil((λx.L)P ) = (λx.L)P =
M . By (term) rule, (S, N) = ([·]P :: nil, λx.L) n (nil, L{P/x}) with, by induction
hypothesis result, (nil, L{P/x}) ↓p1n . The latter implies (S, N) ↓
p1
n . Moreover,
∑
D =∑∑n
i=1
1
nEi =
∑
E1 = p1 = p.
• If M = L ⊕ P , then n = 2, Q1 = L and Q2 = P . Hence, consider S
def
= nil
and N
def
= L ⊕ P : by definition, ES(N) = Enil(L ⊕ P ) = L ⊕ P = M . By (term)
rule, (S, N) = (nil, L ⊕ P )  n (nil, L), (nil, P ) with, by induction hypothesis
result, (nil, L) ↓p1n and (nil, P ) ↓
p2
n . The latter implies (S, N) ↓
1
2
∑
2
i=1
pi
n . Moreover,∑
D =
∑∑n
i=1
1
nEi =
∑∑n
i=1
1
2Ei =
1
2
∑2
i=1
∑
Ei =
1
2
∑2
i=1 pi = p.
• If M = LP and L 7→n R1, . . . , Rn, then Qi = RiP for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Hence,
consider S
def
= [·]P :: nil and N
def
= L: by definition, ES(N) = E[·]P ::nil(L) =
Enil(LP ) = LP = M . By (term) rule, (S, N) = ([·]P :: nil, L)  n ([·]P ::
nil, R1), . . . , ([·]P :: nil, Rn) with, by induction hypothesis result, ([·]P :: nil, Ri) ↓
pi
n
for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The latter implies (S, N) ↓
1
n
∑
n
i=1
pi
n . Moreover,
∑
D =∑∑n
i=1
1
nEi =
1
n
∑n
i=1
∑
Ei =
1
n
∑n
i=1 pi = p.
This concludes the proof. 
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Generally speaking, the two properties above prove the following double implication:
(S,M) ↓pn ⇐⇒ ES(M) ⇓IN D with
∑
D = p. (7)
Then,
p = C(S,M) = sup
q∈R
(S,M) ↓qn= sup
ES(M)⇓IND
∑
D
=
∑
sup
ES(M)⇓IND
D =
∑
[[ES(M)]] = ES(M)⇓p,
which concludes the proof. 
Given M,N ∈ Λ⊕(∅), we define M 
CIU N iff for every S, C(S,M) ≤ C(S, N). This relation
can be extended to a relation on open terms in the usual way. Moreover, we stipulate M ∼=CIU N
iff both M CIU N and N CIU M .
Since CIU is a preorder, proving it to be a precongruence boils down to show the following
implication:
M(CIU)
H
N ⇒M CIU N.
Indeed, the converse implication is a consequence of Lemma 3.12 and the obvious reflexivity of
CIU relation. To do that, we extend Howe’s construction to frame stacks in a natural way:
nilRHnil
(Howstk1)
∅ ⊢M RH N SRHT
([·]M :: S)RH([·]N :: T)
(Howstk2)
Lemma 5.3 For every x ∈ PFIN(X), it holds x ⊢ (λx.M)N ∼=
CIU M{N/x}.
Proof. We need to show that both x ⊢ (λx.M)N CIU M{N/x} and x ⊢ M{N/x} CIU
(λx.M)N hold. Since CIU is defined on open terms by taking closing term-substitutions, it suffices
to show the result for close Λ⊕-terms only: (λx.M)N 
CIU M{N/x} and M{N/x} CIU (λx.M)N .
Let us start with (λx.M)N CIU M{N/x} and prove that, for every close frame stack
S, C(S, (λx.M)N) ≤ C(S,M{N/x}). The latter is an obvious consequence of the fact that
(S, (λx.M)N) reduces to (S,M{N/x}). Let us look into the details distinguishing two cases:
• If S = nil, then (S, (λx.M)N)  n ([·]N :: S, λx.M)  n (S,M{N/x}) which implies that
C(S, (λx.M)N) = supp∈R(S, (λx.M)N) ↓
p
n= supp∈R(S,M{N/x}) ↓
p
n= C(S,M{N/x}).
• If S = [·]L :: T, then we can proceed similarly.
Similarly, to prove the converse, M{N/x} CIU (λx.M)N , let us fix p as (S,M{N/x}) ↓pn and
distinguish two cases:
• If S = nil and p = 0, then (S, (λx.M)N) ↓0n holds too by (empty) rule. Otherwise,
(S,M) n ([·]N :: S, λx.M)
([·]N :: S, λx.M) n (S,M{N/x}) (S,M{N/x}) ↓
p
n
([·]N :: S, λx.M) ↓pn
(term)
(S, (λx.M)N) ↓pn
(term)
which implies C(S,M{N/x}) = supp∈R(S,M{N/x}) ↓
p
n= supp∈R(S, (λx.M)N) ↓
p
n= C(S, (λx.M)N).
• If S = [·]L :: T, then we can proceed similarly.
This concludes the proof. 
Lemma 5.4 For every S,T ∈ FS(∅) and M,N ∈ Λ⊕(∅), if S(
CIU)
H
T and M(CIU)
H
N and
(S,M) ↓pn, then C(T, N) ≥ p.
Proof. We go by induction on the structure of the proof of (S,M) ↓pn, looking at the last rule
used.
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• If (S,M) ↓0n, then trivially C(T, N) ≥ 0.
• If S = nil, M = λx.L and p = 1, then T = nil since S(CIU)
H
T. From M(CIU)
H
N , it
follows that there is P with x ⊢ L (CIU)
H
P and ∅ ⊢ λx.P CIU N . But the latter implies
that C(nil, N) ≥ 1, which is the thesis.
• Otherwise, (term) rule is used and suppose we are in the following situation
(S,M) n (U1, L1), . . . , (Un, Ln) (Ui, Li) ↓
pi
n
(S,M) ↓
1
n
∑
n
i=1
pi
n
(term)
Let us distinguish the following cases as in definition of  n:
• If M = PQ, then n = 1, U1 = [·]Q :: S and L1 = P . From M(
CIU)
H
N it follows that
there are R,S with ∅ ⊢ P (CIU)
H
R, ∅ ⊢ Q (CIU)
H
S and ∅ ⊢ RS CIU N . But then we
can form the following:
∅ ⊢ Q (CIU)
H
S ∅ ⊢ S (CIU)
H
T
∅ ⊢ U1 (
CIU)
H
[·]S :: T
(Howstk2)
and, by the induction hypothesis, conclude that C([·]S :: T, R) ≥ p. Now observe that
(T, RS) n ([·]S :: T, R),
and, as a consequence, C(T, RS) ≥ p, from which the thesis easily follows given that
∅ ⊢ RS CIU N .
• If M = P ⊕ Q, then n = 2, U1 = U2 = S and L1 = P , L2 = Q. From S(
CIU)
H
T, we
get that U1(
CIU)
H
T and U2(
CIU)
H
T. From M(CIU)
H
N it follows that there are R,S
with ∅ ⊢ P (CIU)
H
R, ∅ ⊢ Q (CIU)
H
S and ∅ ⊢ R ⊕ S CIU N . Then, by a double
induction hypothesis, it follows C(T, R) ≥ p and C(T, S) ≥ p. The latter together imply
C(T, R⊕ S) ≥ p, from which the thesis easily follows given that ∅ ⊢ R⊕ S CIU N .
• If M = λx.P , then S = [·]Q :: U because the only case left. Hence n = 1, U1 = U and
L1 = P{Q/x}. From S(
CIU)
H
T, we get that T = [·]R :: V where ∅ ⊢ Q (CIU)
H
R and
U(CIU)
H
V. From M(CIU)
H
N , it follows that for some S, it holds that x ⊢ P (CIU)
H
S
and ∅ ⊢ λx.S CIU N . Now:
(T, λx.S) = ([·]R :: V, λx.S) n (V, S{R/x}). (8)
From x ⊢ P (CIU)
H
S and ∅ ⊢ Q (CIU)
H
R, by substitutivity of CIU, follow that ∅ ⊢
P{Q/x} (CIU)
H
S{R/x} holds. By induction hypothesis, it follows that C(V, S{R/x}) ≥ p.
Then, from (8) and ∅ ⊢ λx.S CIU N , the thesis easily follows:
C(T, N) ≥ C(T, λx.S) = C(V, S{R/x}) ≥ p.
This concludes the proof. 
Theorem 5.5 For all x ∈ PFIN(X) and for all M, N ∈ Λ⊕(x), x ⊢M 
CIU N iff x ⊢M ≤⊕ N .
Proof. (⇒) SinceCIU is defined on open terms by taking closing term-substitutions, by Lemma 3.13
both it and (CIU)
H
are closed under term-substitution. Then, it suffices to show the result for
closed Λ⊕-terms: for all M, N ∈ Λ⊕(∅), if ∅ ⊢ M 
CIU N , then ∅ ⊢ M ≤⊕ N . Since 
CIU is
reflexive, by Lemma 3.10 follows that (CIU)
H
is compatible, hence reflexive too. Taking T = S in
Lemma 5.4, we conclude that ∅ ⊢ M (CIU)
H
N implies ∅ ⊢ M CIU N . As we have remarked
before the lemma, the latter entails that (CIU)
H
=CIU which implies CIU of being compatible.
Moreover, from Lemma 5.2 immediately follows that CIU is also adequate. Thus, CIU is contained
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in the largest compatible adequate Λ⊕-relation, ≤
ca
⊕ . From Lemma 4.6 follows that 
CIU is actually
contained in ≤⊕. In particular, the latter means ∅ ⊢M 
CIU N implies ∅ ⊢M ≤⊕ N .
(⇐) First of all, please observe that, since context preorder is compatible, if ∅ ⊢M ≤⊕ N then,
for all S ∈ FS(∅), ∅ ⊢ ES(M) ≤⊕ ES(N) by Lemma 3.35. Then, by adequacy property of ≤⊕ and
Lemma 5.2, the latter implies ∅ ⊢ M CIU N . Ultimately, it holds that ∅ ⊢ M ≤⊕ N implies
∅ ⊢M CIU N . Let us take into account the general case of open terms. If x ⊢M ≤⊕ N , then
by compatibility property of ≤⊕ it follows ∅ ⊢ λx.M ≤⊕ λx.N and hence ∅ ⊢ λx.M 
CIU λx.N .
Then, from the fact that CIU is compatible (as established in (⇒) part of this proof) and Lemma 5.3,
for every suitable L ⊆ Λ⊕(∅), it holds ∅ ⊢M{L/x} 
CIU N{L/x}, i.e. x ⊢M CIU N . 
Corollary 5.6 ∼=CIU coincides with ≃⊕.
Proof. Straightforward consequence of Theorem 5.5. 
Proposition 5.7 ≤⊕ and . do not coincide.
Proof. We will prove that M CIU N but M 6. N , where
M
def
= λx.λy.x⊕ y;
N
def
= (λx.λy.x)⊕ (λx.λy.y).
M 6. N can be easily verified, so let us concentrate on M CIU N , and prove that for every S,
C(S,M) ≤ C(S, N). Let us distinguish three cases:
• If S = nil, then (S,M) cannot be further reduced and (S, N)  n (S, λx.λy.x), (S, λx.λy.y),
where the last two pairs cannot be reduced. As a consequence, C(S,M) = 0 = C(S, N).
• If S = [·]L :: T, then we can proceed similarly.
• If S = [·]L :: [·]P :: T, then observe that
(S,M) n ([·]P :: T, λy.L⊕ y) n (T, L⊕ P )
 n (T, L), (T, P );
(S, N) n (S, λx.λy.x), (S, λx.λy.y);
(S, λx.λy.x) n ([·]P :: T, λy.L) n (T, L);
(S, λx.λy.y) n ([·]P :: T, λy.y) n (T, P ).
As a consequence,
C(S,M) =
1
2
C(T, L) +
1
2
C(T, P ) = C(S, N).
This concludes the proof. 
Example 5.8 We consider again the programs from Example 2.6. Terms expone and exptwo
only differ because the former performs all probabilistic choices on natural numbers obtained by
applying a function to its argument, while in the latter choices are done at the functional level,
and the argument to those functions is provided only at a later stage. As a consequence, the two
terms are not applicative bisimilar, and the reason is akin to that for the inequality of the terms
in Example 3.38. In contrast, the bisimilarity between expone and expthree k, where k is any
natural number, intuitively holds because both expone and expthree k evaluate to a single term
when fed with a function, while they start evolving in a genuinely probabilistic way only after the
second argument is provided. At that point, the two functions evolve in very different ways, but
their semantics (in the sense of Section 2) is the same (cf., Lemma 3.4). As a bisimulation one
can use the equivalence generated by the relation(⋃
k
{(expone, expthree k)}
)
∪ {(M,N) | [[M ]] = [[N ]]}
∪
(⋃
L
{(λn.B{L/f}, λn.C{L/f})}
)
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using B and C for the body of expone and expthree respectively.
6 The Discriminating Power of Probabilistic Contexts
We show here that applicative bisimilarity and context equivalence collapse if the tested terms
are pure, deterministic, λ-terms. In other words, if the probabilistic choices are brought into the
terms only through the inputs supplied to the tested functions, applicative bisimilarity and context
equivalence yield exactly the same discriminating power. To show this, we prove that, on pure
λ-terms, both relations coincide with the Levy-Longo tree equality, which equates terms with the
same Levy-Longo tree (briefly LLT) [14].
LLT’s are the lazy variant of Bo¨hm Trees (briefly BT), the most popular tree structure in
the λ-calculus. BT’s only correctly express the computational content of λ-terms in a strong
regime, while they fail to do so in the lazy one. For instance, the term λx.Ω and Ω, as both
unsolvable [4], have identical BT’s, but in a lazy regime we would always distinguish between them;
hence they have different LLT’s. LLT’s were introduced by Longo [30], developing an original
idea by Levy [29]. The Levy-Longo tree of M , LT (M), is coinductively constructed as follows:
LT (M)
def
= λx1. . . . xn.⊥ if M is an unsolvable of order n; LT (M)
def
= ⊤ if M is an unsolvable of
order∞; finally if M has principal head normal form λx1. . . . xn.yM1 . . .Mm, then LT (M) is a tree
with root λx1. . . . xn.y and with LT (M1), . . . , LT (Mm) as subtrees. Being defined coinductively,
LLT’s can of course be infinite. We write M =LL N iff LT (M) = LT (N).
Example 6.1 Let Ξ be an unsolvable of order ∞ such as Ξ
def
= (λx.λy.(xx))(λx.λy.(xx)), and
consider the terms
M
def
= λx.(x(λy.(xΞΩy))Ξ); N
def
= λx.(x(xΞΩ)Ξ).
These terms have been used to prove non-full-abstraction results in a canonical model for the
lazy λ-calculus by Abramsky and Ong [2]. For this, they show that in the model the convergence
test is definable (this operator, when it receives an argument, would return the identity function
if the supplied argument is convergent, and would diverge otherwise). The convergence test, ∇,
can distinguish between the two terms, as M∇ reduces to an abstraction, whereas N∇ diverges.
However, no pure λ-term can make the same distinction. The two terms also have different LL
trees:
LT (M) = λx.x
 ❅
λy.x ⊤
❅ 
⊤ ⊥ y
LT (N) = λx.x
 ❅
x ⊤
❅ 
⊤ ⊥
Although in Λ⊕, as in Λ, the convergence test operator is not definable, M and N can be separated
using probabilities by running them in a context C that would feed Ω⊕ λz.λu.z as argument; then
C[M ]⇓ 1
2
whereas C[N ]⇓ 1
4
.
Example 6.2 Abramsky’s canonical model is itself coarser than LLT equality. For instance, the
terms M
def
= λx.xx and N
def
= λx.(xλy.(xy)), have different LLT’s but are equal in Abramsky’s
model (and hence equal for context equivalence in Λ). They are separated by context equivalence in
Λ⊕, for instance using the context C
def
= [·](I ⊕ Ω), since C[M ]⇓ 1
4
whereas C[N ]⇓ 1
2
.
We already know that on full Λ⊕, applicative bisimilarity (∼) implies context equivalence (≃⊕).
Hence, to prove that on pure λ-terms the two equivalences collapse to LLT equality (=LL), it
suffices to prove that, for those pure terms, ≃⊕ implies =LL, and that =LL implies ∼.
The first implication is obtained by a variation on the Bo¨hm-out technique, a powerful method-
ology for separation results in the λ-calculus, often employed in proofs about local structure
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characterisation theorems of λ-models. For this we exploit an inductive characterisation of LLT
equality via stratification approximants (Definition 6.5). The key Lemma 6.7 shows that any
difference on the trees of two λ-terms within level n can be observed by a suitable context of the
probabilistic λ-calculus.
We write ⊎M as an abbreviation for the term Ω ⊕M . We denote by Qn, n > 0, the term
λx1. . . . λxn.xnx1x2 · · ·xn−1. This is usually called the Bo¨hm permutator of degree n. Bo¨hm
permutators play a key role in the Bo¨hm-out technique. A variant of them, the ⊎-permutators,
play a pivotal role in Lemma 6.7 below. A term M ∈ Λ⊕ is a ⊎-permutator of degree n if either
M = Qn or there exists 0 ≤ r < n such that
M = λx1. . . . λxr. ⊎ λxr+1 · · ·λxn.xnx1 · · ·xn−1 .
Finally, a function f from the positive integers to λ-terms is a ⊎-permutator function if, for all
n, f(n) is a ⊎-permutator of degree n. Before giving the main technical lemma, it is useful some
auxiliary concepts. The definitions below rely on two notions of reduction: M −→p N means
that M call-by-name reduces to N in one step with probability p. (As a matter of fact, p can be
either 1 or 12 .) Then =⇒ is obtained by composing −→ zero or more times (and multiplying the
corresponding real numbers). If p = 1 (because, e.g., we are dealing with pure λ-terms) =⇒p can
be abbreviated just as =⇒. With a slight abuse of notation, we also denote with =⇒ the multi-step
lazy reduction relation of pure, open terms. The specialised form of probabilistic choice ⊎M can
be thought of as a new syntactic construct. Thus Λ⊎ is the set of pure λ-terms extended with the
⊎ operator. As ⊎ is a derived operator, its operational rules are the expected ones:
⊎M −→ 1
2
Ω
⊎L
⊎M −→ 1
2
M
⊎R
The restriction on =⇒ in which ⊎R, but not ⊎L, can be applied, is called ⇛. In the following, we
need the following lemma:
Lemma 6.3 Let M,N,L, P be closed Λ⊎ terms. Suppose
∑
[[M ]] =
∑
[[N ]], that M ⇛p L and
N ⇛p P . Then also
∑
[[L]] =
∑
[[P ]].
Proof. Of course, p = 12n for some integer n ∈ N. Then
∑
[[L]] = 2n
∑
[[M ]] = 2n
∑
[[N ]] =
∑
[[P ]].

The proof of the key Lemma 6.7 below makes essential use of a characterization of =LL by a
bisimulation-like form of relation:
Definition 6.4 (Open Bisimulation) A relation R on pure λ-terms is an open bisimulation if
M R N implies:
1. if M =⇒ λx.L, then N =⇒ λx.P and L R P ;
2. if M =⇒ xL1 · · ·Lm, then P1, . . . , Pm exist such that N =⇒ xP1 · · ·Pm and Li R Pi for every
1 ≤ i ≤ m;
and conversely on reductions from N . Open bisimilarity, written ∼O, is the union of all open
bisimulations.
Open bisimulation has the advantage of very easily providing a notion of approximation:
Definition 6.5 (Approximants of ∼O) We set:
• ∼O0
def
= Λ× Λ;
• M ∼On+1 N when
1. if M =⇒ λx.L, then P exists such that N =⇒ λx.P and L ∼On P ;
2. if M =⇒ xL1 · · ·Lm, then P1, . . . , Pm exist such that N =⇒ xP1 · · ·Pm and Li ∼
O
n Pi, for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
and conversely on the reductions from N .
Please observe that:
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Lemma 6.6 On pure λ-terms, the relations =LL, ∼
O and (
⋂
n∈N ∼
O
n ) all coincide.
We are now ready to state and prove the key technical lemma:
Lemma 6.7 SupposeM 6∼On N for some n, and let {x1, . . . , xr} be the free variables inM,N . Then
there are integers mx1 , . . . ,mxr and k, and permutator functions fx1 , . . . , fxr such that, for all m >
k, there are closed terms Rm such that the following holds: ifM{fx1(m+mx1)/x1} . . . {fxr (m+mxr )/xr}Rm⇓r
and N{fx1(m+mx1)/x1} . . . {fxr (m+mxr )/xr}Rm⇓s , then r 6= s.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the least n such that M 6∼On N . For any term M , M
f
will stand for M{fx1(m+mx1)/x1} . . . {fxr (m+mxr )/xr} where x1 . . . xr are the free variables in
M . We also write Ωm for a sequence of m occurrences of Ω: so, e.g., MΩ3 is MΩΩΩ. Finally, for
any term M , we write M ⇑ to denote the fact that M does not converge.
• Basic case. M 6∼O1 N . There are a few cases to consider (their symmetric ones are analo-
gous).
• The case where only one of the two terms diverges is easy.
• M =⇒ xM1 · · ·Mt and N =⇒ xN1 · · ·Ns with t < s. Take mx = s and fx(n) = Qn (the
Bo¨hm permutator of degree n). The values of the other integers (k,my for y 6= x) and of
the other permutation functions are irrelevant. Set Rm
def
= Ωm. We have
MfΩm =⇒ Qm+sM
f
1 . . .M
f
t Ω
m ⇓1
since t+m < s+m. We also have
NfΩm =⇒ Qm+sN
f
1 . . . N
f
s Ω
m ⇑
since m > 0 and therefore an Ω term will be end up at the head of the term.
• M =⇒ xM1 · · ·Mt and N =⇒ yN1 · · ·Ns with x 6= y. Assume t ≤ s without loss of
generality. Take mx = s + 1, my = s, and fx(n) = fy(n) = Qn. The values of the other
integers and permutation functions are irrelevant. Set Rm
def
= Ωm. We have
MfΩm =⇒ Qm+s+1M
f
1 . . .M
f
t Ω
m ⇓1
since m+ s+ 1 > t+m. We also have
NfΩm =⇒ Qm+sN
f
1 . . . N
f
s Ω
m ⇑
since m > 0 and therefore an Ω term will be end up at the head of the term.
• M =⇒ λx.M ′ and N =⇒ yN , for some y and N . The values of the integers and permutator
functions are irrelevant. Set Rm
def
= ∅ (the empty sequence), and fy(n)
def
= ⊎Qn. We have
Mf =⇒ λx.M ′f ⇓1, whereas
Nf =⇒ ⊎Qm+myN
f ⇓<1
• Inductive case: M 6∼On+1N . There are two cases to look at.
• M =⇒ xM1 · · ·Ms, N =⇒ xN1 · · ·Ns and for some i, Mi 6∼
O
nNi. By induction, (for all
variables y) there are integers my, k and permutator functions fy, such that for all m > k
there are Sm and we have
∑
[[Mfi Sm]] 6=
∑
[[Nfi Sm]]. Redefine k if necessary so to make sure
that k > s. Set Rm
def
= Ωm+mx−s−1(λx1 . . . xm+mx .xi)Sm. We have:
MfRm =⇒ fx(m+mx)M
f
1 . . .M
f
s Ω
m+mx−s−1(λx1 . . . xm+mx .xi)Sm =⇒p M
f
i Sm
whereas
NfRm =⇒ fx(m+mx)N
f
1 . . . N
f
s Ω
m+mx−s−1(λx1 . . . xm+mx .xi)Sm =⇒p N
f
i Sm
where p is 12 or 1 depending on whether fx contains ⊎ or not. In any case, in both
derivations, rule ⊎L has not been used. By Lemma 6.3 and the inductive assumption∑
[[Mfi Sm]] 6=
∑
[[Nfi Sm]] we derive that
∑
[[MfRm]] 6=
∑
[[NfRm]] too.
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• M =⇒ λx.M ′, N =⇒ λx.N ′ and M ′ 6∼OnN
′. By induction, (for all variables y) there are
integers my, k and permutator functions fy, such that for all m > k there are Sm and we
have
∑
[[M ′fSm]] 6=
∑
[[N ′fSm]]. Set Rm
def
= fx(m+mx)Sm. Below for a term L, L
f−x is
defined as Lf except that variable x is left uninstantiated. We have:
MfRm =⇒ (λx.M
′f−x)fx(m+mx)Sm −→ (M
′f−x{fx(m+mx)/x})Sm =M
′fSm
whereas
NfRm =⇒ (λx.N
′f−x)fx(m+mx)Sm −→ (N
′f−x{fx(m+mx)/x})Sm = N
′fSm
Again, by Lemma 6.3 and the inductive hypothesis, we derive
∑
[[MfRm]] 6=
∑
[[NfRm]].
This concludes the proof. 
The fact the Bo¨hm-out technique actually works implies that the discriminating power of
probabilistic contexts is at least as strong as the one of LLT’s.
Corollary 6.8 For M,N ∈ Λ, M≃⊕N implies M =LL N .
To show that LLT equality is included in probabilistic applicative bisimilarity, we proceed as follows.
First we define a refinement of the latter, essentially one in which we observe all probabilistic choices.
As a consequence, the underlying bisimulation game may ignore probabilities. The obtained notion
of equivalence is strictly finer than probabilistic applicative bisimilarity. The advantage of the
refinement is that both the inclusion of LLT equality in the refinement, and the inclusion of the
latter in probabilistic applicative bisimilarity turn out to be relatively easy to prove. A direct proof
of the inclusion of LLT equality in probabilistic applicative bisimilarity would have been harder,
as it would have required extending the notion of a Levy-Longo tree to Λ⊕, then reasoning on
substitution closures of such trees.
Definition 6.9 A relation R ⊆ Λ⊕(∅) × Λ⊕(∅) is a strict applicative bisimulation whenever
M R N implies
1. if M −→1 P , then N =⇒1 Q and P R Q;
2. if M −→ 1
2
P , then N =⇒ 1
2
Q and P R Q;
3. if M = λx.P , then N =⇒1 λx.Q and P{L/x} R Q{L/x} for all L ∈ Λ⊕(∅);
4. the converse of 1., 2. and 3..
Strict applicative bisimilarity is the union of all strict applicative bisimulations.
If two terms have the same LLT, then passing them the same argument M ∈ Λ⊕ produces exactly
the same choice structure: intuitively, whenever the first term finds (a copy of) M in head position,
also the second will find M .
Lemma 6.10 If M =LL N then M R N , for some strict applicative bisimulation R.
Terms which are strict applicative bisimilar cannot be distinguished by applicative bisimilarity
proper, since the requirements induced by the latter are less strict than the ones the former imposes:
Lemma 6.11 Strict applicative bisimilarity is included in applicative bisimilarity.
Since we now know that for pure, deterministic λ-terms, =LL is included in ∼ (by Lemma 6.10
and Lemma 6.11), that ∼ is included in ≃⊕ (by Theorem 3.37) and that the latter is included in
=LL (Corollary 6.8), we can conclude:
Corollary 6.12 The relations =LL, ∼, and ≃⊕ coincide in Λ.
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7 Coupled Logical Bisimulation
In this section we derive a coinductive characterisation of probabilistic context equivalence on the
whole language Λ⊕ (as opposed to the subset of sum-free λ-terms as in Section 6). For this, we
need to manipulate formal weighted sums. Thus we work with an extension of Λ⊕ in which such
weighted sums may appear in redex position. An advantage of having formal sums is that the
transition system on the extended language can be small-step and deterministic — any closed term
that is not a value will have exactly one possible internal transition.
This will make it possible to pursue the logical bisimulation method, in which the congruence
of bisimilarity is proved using a standard induction argument over all contexts. The refinement
of the method handling probabilities, called coupled logical bisimulation, uses pairs of relations,
as we need to distinguish between ordinary terms and terms possibly containing formal sums.
Technically, in the proof of congruence we first prove a correspondence between the transition
system on extended terms and the original one for Λ⊕; we then derive a few up-to techniques for
coupled logical bisimulations that are needed in the following proofs; finally, we show that coupled
logical bisimulations are preserved by the closure of the first relation with any context, and the
closure of the second relation with any evaluation context.
We preferred to follow logical bisimulations rather then environmental bisimulations because the
former admit a simpler definition (in the latter, each pair of terms is enriched with an environment,
that is, an extra set of pairs of terms). Moreover it is unclear what environments should be when
one also considers formal sums. We leave this for future work.
Formal sums are a tool for representing the behaviour of running Λ⊕ terms. Thus, on terms
with formal sums, only the results for closed terms interest us. However, the characterization of
contextual equivalence in Λ⊕ as coupled logical bisimulation also holds on open terms.
7.1 Notation and Terminology
We write ΛFS⊕ for the extension of Λ⊕ in which formal sums may appear in redex position. Terms
of ΛFS⊕ are defined as follows (M,N being Λ⊕-terms):
E,F ::= EM | Σi∈I〈Mi, pi〉 | M ⊕N | λx.M.
In a formal sum Σi∈I〈Mi, pi〉, I is a countable (possibly empty) set of indices such that
∑
i∈I pi ≤ 1.
We use + for binary formal sums. Formal sums are ranged over by metavariables like H,K. When
eachMi is a value (i.e., an abstraction) then Σi∈I〈Mi, pi〉 is a (formally summed) value; such values
are ranged over by Z, Y,X. If H = Σi∈I〈Mi, pi〉 and K = Σj∈J〈Mj , pj〉 where I and J are disjoint,
then H ⊕K abbreviates Σr∈I∪J〈Mr,
pr
2 〉. Similarly, if for every j ∈ J Hj is Σi∈I〈Mi,j , pi,j〉, then
Σj〈Hj , pj〉 stands for Σ(i,j)〈Mi,j , pi,j · pj〉. For H = Σi〈Mi, pi〉 we write Σ(H) for the real number∑
i pi. If Z = Σi〈λx.Mi, pi〉, then Z •N stands for Σi〈Mi{
N/x}, pi〉. The set of closed terms is
ΛFS⊕ (∅).
Any partial value distribution D (in the sense of Section 2) can be seen as the formal sum
ΣV ∈VΛ⊕〈V,D(V )〉. Similarly, any formal sum H = Σi∈I〈Mi, pi〉 can be mapped to the distribution∑
i∈I pi · [[Mi]], that we indicate with [[H]].
Reduction between ΛFS⊕ terms, written E  F , is defined by the rules in Figure 6; these rules
are given on top of the operational semantics for Λ⊕ as defined in Section 2, which is invoked in the
premise of rule spc (if there is a i with Mi not a value). The reduction relation  is deterministic
and strongly normalizing. We use  for its reflexive and transitive closure. Lemma 7.1 shows the
agreement between the new reduction relation and the original one.
Lemma 7.1 For all M ∈ Λ⊕(∅) there is a value Z such that M  Z and [[M ]] = [[Z]].
Proof. One first show that for all E there is n such that E  n Z. Then one reasons with a double
induction: an induction on n, and a transition induction, exploiting the determinism of  . 
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M ⊕N  〈M, 12 〉+ 〈N,
1
2 〉
ss
λx.M  〈λx.M, 1〉
sl
[[Mi]] = Di
Σi〈Mi, pi〉 Σi〈Di, pi〉
spc
ZM  Z •M
sp E  F
EM  FM
sa
Figure 6: Reduction Rules for ΛFS⊕
7.2 Context Equivalence and Bisimulation
In ΛFS⊕ certain terms (i.e., formal sums) may only appear in redex position; ordinary terms (i.e.,
terms in Λ⊕), by contrast, may appear in arbitrary position. When extending context equivalence
to ΛFS⊕ we therefore have to distinguish these two cases. Moreover, as our main objective is the
characterisation of context equivalence in Λ⊕, we set a somewhat constrained context equivalence
in ΛFS⊕ in which contexts may not contain formal sums (thus the Λ
FS
⊕ contexts are the same as
the Λ⊕ contexts). We call these simple Λ
FS
⊕ contexts, whereas we call general Λ
FS
⊕ context an
unconstrained context, i.e., a ΛFS⊕ term in which the hole [·] may appear in any places where a term
from Λ⊕ was expected — including within a formal sum. (Later we will see that allowing general
contexts does not affect the resulting context equivalence.) Terms possibly containing formal sums
are tested in evaluation contexts, i.e., contexts of the form [·]M . We write Ep if E  Z and
Σ(Z) = p (recall that Z is unique, for a given E).
Definition 7.2 (Context Equivalence in ΛFS⊕ ) Two Λ⊕-terms M and N are context equiva-
lent in ΛFS⊕ , written M ≃
FS
⊕ N , if for all (closing) simple Λ
FS
⊕ contexts C, we have C[M ]p iff
C[N ]p. Two Λ
FS
⊕ -terms E and F are evaluation-context equivalent, written E ≅
FS
⊕ F , if for all
(closing) ΛFS⊕ evaluation contexts C, we have C[E]p iff C[F ]p.
In virtue of Lemma 7.1, context equivalence in Λ⊕ coincides with context equivalence in Λ
FS
⊕ .
We now introduce a bisimulation that yields a coinductive characterisation of context equivalence
(and also of evaluation-context equivalence). A coupled relation is a pair (V, E) where: V ⊆
Λ⊕(∅) × Λ⊕(∅), E ⊆ Λ
FS
⊕ (∅) × Λ
FS
⊕ (∅), and V ⊆ E . Intuitively, we place in V the pairs of terms
that should be preserved by all contexts, and in E those that should be preserved by evaluation
contexts. For a coupled relation R = (V, E) we write R1 for V and R2 for E . The union of coupled
relations is defined componentwise: e.g., if R and S are coupled relations, then the coupled relation
R ∪ S has (R ∪ S)1
def
= R1 ∪ S1 and (R ∪ S)2
def
= R2 ∪ S2. If V is a relation on Λ⊕, then V
C is
the context closure of V in Λ⊕, i.e., the set of all (closed) terms of the form (C[M ], C[N ]) where C
is a multi-hole Λ⊕ context and M V N .
Definition 7.3 A coupled relation R is a coupled logical bisimulation if whenever E R2 F we
have:
1. if E  D, then F  G, where D R2 G;
2. if E is a formally summed value, then F  Y with Σ(E) = Σ(Y ), and for all M RC1 N we
have (E •M) R2 (Y •N);
3. the converse of 1. and 2..
Coupled logical bisimilarity, ≈, is the union of all coupled logical bisimulations (hence ≈1 is the
union of the first component of all coupled logical bisimulations, and similarly for ≈2).
In a coupled bisimulation (R1,R2), the bisimulation game is only played on the pairs in R2.
However, the first relation R1 is relevant, as inputs for tested functions are built using R1 (Clause
2. of Definition 7.3). Actually, also the pairs in R1 are tested, because in any coupled relations it
must be R1 ⊆ R2. The values produced by the bisimulation game for coupled bisimulation on R2
are formal sums (not plain λ-terms), and this is why we do not require them to be in R1: formal
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sums should only appear in redex position, but terms in R1 can be used as arguments to bisimilar
functions and can therefore end up in arbitrary positions.
We will see below another aspect of the relevance of R1: the proof technique of logical
bisimulation only allows us to prove substitutivity of the bisimilarity in arbitrary contexts for the
pairs of terms in R1. For pairs in R2 but not in R1 the proof technique only allows us to derive
preservation in evaluation contexts.
In the proof of congruence of coupled logical bisimilarity we will push “as many terms as
possible” into the first relation, i.e., the first relation will be as large as possible. However, in
proofs of bisimilarity for concrete terms, the first relation may be very small, possibly a singleton
or even empty. Then the bisimulation clauses become similar to those of applicative bisimulation
(as inputs of tested function are “almost” identical). Summing up, in coupled logical bisimulation
the use of two relations gives us more flexibility than in ordinary logical bisimulation: depending
on the needs, we can tune the size of the first relation. It is possible that some of the above aspects
of coupled logical bisimilarity be specific to call-by-name, and that the call-by-value version would
require non-trivial modifications.
Remark 7.4 In a coupled logical bisimulation, the first relation is used to construct the inputs for
the tested functions (the formally summed values produced in the bisimulation game for the second
relation). Therefore, such first relation may be thought of as a “global” environment— global because
it is the same for each pair of terms on which the bisimulation game is played. As a consequence,
coupled logical bisimulation remains quite different from environmental bisimulation [45], where
the “environment” for constructing inputs is local to each pair of tested terms. Coupled logical
bisimulation follows ordinary logical bisimulation [44], in which there is only one global environment;
in ordinary logical bisimulation, however, the global environment coincides with the set of tested
terms. The similarity with logical bisimulation is also revealed by non-monotonicity of the associated
functional (in contrast, the functional associated to environmental bisimulation is monotone); see
Remark 7.17.
As an example of use of coupled logical bisimulation, we revisit the counterexample 3.38 to the
completeness of applicative bisimilarity with respect to contextual equivalence.
Example 7.5 We consider the terms of Example 3.38 and show that they are in ≈1, hence
also in ≃⊕ (contextual equivalence of Λ⊕), by Corollary 7.12 and ≃
FS
⊕ = ≃⊕. Recall that the
terms are M
def
= λx.(L ⊕ P ) and N
def
= (λx.L) ⊕ (λx.P ) for L
def
= λz.Ω and P
def
= λy.λz.Ω.
We set R1 to contain only (M,N) (this is the pair that interests us), and R2 to contain the
pairs (M,N), (〈M, 1〉, 〈λx.L, 12 〉+ 〈λx.P,
1
2 〉), (〈L+ P, 1〉, 〈L,
1
2 〉+ 〈P,
1
2 〉), and a set of pairs with
identical components, namely (〈L, 12 〉+〈P,
1
2 〉, 〈L,
1
2 〉+〈P,
1
2 〉), (〈Ω,
1
2 〉+〈λu.Ω,
1
2 〉, 〈Ω,
1
2 〉+〈λu.Ω,
1
2 〉),
(〈λu.Ω, 12 〉, 〈λu.Ω,
1
2 〉), (〈Ω,
1
2 〉, 〈Ω,
1
2 〉), (∅, ∅), where ∅ is the empty formal sum. Thus (R1,R2) is
a coupled logical bisimulation.
The main challenge towards the goal of relating coupled logical bisimilarity and context equivalence
is the substitutivity of bisimulation. We establish the latter exploiting some up-to techniques for
bisimulation. We only give the definitions of the techniques, omitting the statements about their
soundness. The first up-to technique allows us to drop the bisimulation game on silent actions:
Definition 7.6 (Big-Step Bisimulation) A coupled relation R is a big-step coupled logical
bisimulation if whenever E R2 F , the following holds: if E  Z then F  Y with Σ(Z) = Σ(Y ),
and for all M RC1 N we have (Z •M) R2 (Y •N).
Lemma 7.7 If R is a big-step coupled logical bisimulation, then R ⊆S for some coupled logical
bisimulation S.
In the reduction  , computation is performed at the level of formal sums; and this is reflected,
in coupled bisimulation, by the application of values to formal sums only. The following up-to
technique allows computation, and application of input values, also with ordinary terms. In the
40
definition, we extract a formal sum from a term E in ΛFS⊕ using the function D(·) inductively as
follows:
D(EM)
def
= Σi〈MiM,pi〉 whenever D(E) = Σi〈Mi, pi〉;
D(M)
def
= 〈M, 1〉; D(H)
def
= H.
Definition 7.8 A coupled relation R is a bisimulation up-to formal sums if, whenever E R2 F ,
then either (one of the bisimulation clauses of Definition 7.3 applies), or (E,F ∈ Λ⊕ and one of
the following clauses applies):
1. E  D with D(D) = 〈M, 12 〉+ 〈N,
1
2 〉, and F  G with D(G) = 〈L,
1
2 〉+ 〈P,
1
2 〉, M R2 L, and
N R2 P ;
2. E = λx.M and F = λx.N , and for all P RC1 Q we have M{P/x} R2 N{Q/x};
3. E = (λx.M)PM and F = (λx.N)QN , and M{P/x}M R2 N{Q/x}N .
According to Definition 7.8, in the bisimulation game for a coupled relation, given a pair (E,F ) ∈ R2,
we can either choose to follow the bisimulation game in the original Definition 7.3; or, if E and F do
not contain formal sums, we can try one of the new clauses above. The advantage of the first new
clause is that it allows us to make a split on the derivatives of the original terms. The advantage of
the other two new clauses is that they allow us to directly handle the given λ-terms, without using
the operational rules of Figure 6 and therefore without introducing formal sums. To understand the
first clause, suppose E
def
= (M ⊕N)L and F
def
= P ⊕Q. We have E  (〈M, 12 〉+ 〈N,
1
2 〉)L
def
= G with
D(G) = 〈ML, 12 〉+ 〈NL,
1
2 〉, and F  〈P,
1
2 〉+ 〈Q,
1
2 〉
def
= H, with D(H) = H, and it is sufficient
now to ensure (ML) R2 P , and (NL) R2 Q.
Lemma 7.9 If R is a bisimulation up-to formal sums, then R ⊆S for some coupled logical
bisimulation S.
Proof. We show that the coupled relation S, with S1= R1 and
S2
def
= R2∪{(Σi〈Hi, pi〉,Σi〈Ki, pi〉) s.t. for each i, either Hi R2 Ki
or Hi = 〈Mi, 1〉,Ki = 〈Ni, 1〉 and Mi R2 Ni },
is a big-step bisimulation and then apply Lemma 7.7. The key point for this is to show that
whenever M R2 N , if M  Z and N  Y , then Z S2 Y .
For this, roughly, we reason on the tree whose nodes are the pairs of terms produced by the
up-to bisimulation game for R2 and with root a pair (M,N) in R2 (and with the proviso that a
node (E,F ), if not a pair of values, and not a pair of Λ⊕-terms, has one only child, namely (Z, Y )
for Z, Y s.t. E  Z and F  Y ).
Certain paths in the tree may be divergent; those that reach a leaf give the formal sums that
M and N produce. Thus, if M =⇒ Z and N =⇒ Y , then we can write Z = Σi〈Zi, pi〉 and
Y = Σi〈Yi, pi〉, for Zi, Yi, pi s.t. {(Zi, Yi, pi)} represent exactly the multiset of the leaves in the
tree together with the probability of the path reaching each leaf. 
Using the above proof technique, we can prove the necessary substitutivity property for bisimulation.
The use of up-to techniques, and the way bisimulation is defined (in particular the presence of a
clause for τ -steps and the possibility of using the pairs in the bisimulation itself to construct inputs
for functions), make it possible to use a standard argument by induction over contexts.
Lemma 7.10 If R is a bisimulation then the context closure S with
S1
def
= RC1 ;
S2
def
= R2 ∪ R
C
1 ∪{(EM,FN) s.t. E R2 F and Mi R
C
1 Ni};
is a bisimulation up-to formal sums.
41
Corollary 7.11 1. M ≈1 N implies C[M ] ≈1 C[N ], for all C
2. E ≈2 F implies C[E] ≈2 C[F ], for all evaluation contexts C.
Using Lemma 7.10 we can prove the inclusion in context equivalence.
Corollary 7.12 If M ≈1 N then M ≃
FS
⊕ N . Moreover, if E ≈2 F then E ≅
FS
⊕ F .
The converse of Corollary 7.12 is proved exploiting a few simple properties of ≅FS⊕ (e.g., its
transitivity, the inclusion  ⊆ ≅FS⊕ ).
Lemma 7.13 E  E′ implies E ≅FS⊕ E
′.
Proof. If E  E′ then E ≈2 E
′ hence E ≅FS⊕ E
′. 
Lemma 7.14 Z ≅FS⊕ Y implies Z •M ≅
FS
⊕ Y •M for all M .
Proof. Follows from definition of ≅FS⊕ , transitivity of ≅
FS
⊕ , and Lemma 7.13. 
Lemma 7.15 If Mi ≃
FS
⊕ Ni for each i, then Σi〈Mi, pi〉 ≅
FS
⊕ Σi〈Ni, pi〉
Proof. Suppose Σi〈Mi, pi〉M  Z and Σi〈Ni, pi〉M  Y . We have to show Σ(Z) = Σ(Y ). We
have Z = Σi〈Zi, pi〉 for Zi with Mi  Zi. Similarly Y = Σi〈Yi, pi〉 for Yi with Ni  Ni. Then
the result follows from Σ(Zi) = Σ(Yi). 
Theorem 7.16 We have ≃FS⊕ ⊆ ≈1, and ≅
FS
⊕ ⊆ ≈2.
Proof. We take the coupled relation R with
R1
def
= {(M,N) s.t.M ≃FS⊕ N}
R2
def
= {(E,F ) s.t. E ≅FS⊕ F}}
and show that R is a bisimulation.
For clause (1), one uses Lemma 7.13 and transitivity of ≅FS⊕ . For clause (2), consider a term Z
with Z ≅FS⊕ F . By definition of ≅
FS
⊕ , F
 Y with Σ(Z) = Σ(Y ). Take now arguments M ≃FS⊕ N
(which is sufficient, since ≃FS⊕
C
⊆≃FS⊕ ). By Lemma 7.14, Z •M ≅
FS
⊕ Y • N . By Lemma 7.15,
W •M ≅FS⊕ Y •N . Hence also Z •M ≅
FS
⊕ Y •N , and we have Z •M R2 Y •N . 
It also holds that coupled logical bisimilarity is preserved by the formal sum construct; i.e.,Mi ≈1 Ni
for each i ∈ I implies Σi∈I〈Mi, pi〉 ≈2 Σi∈I〈Ni, pi〉. As a consequence, context equivalence defined
on general ΛFS⊕ contexts is the same as that set on simple contexts (Definition 7.2).
Remark 7.17 The functional induced by coupled logical bisimulation is not monotone. For
instance, if V ⊆ W, then a pair of terms may satisfy the bisimulation clauses on (V, E), for some
E, but not on (W, E), because the input for functions may be taken from the larger relation W.
(Recall that coupled relations are pairs of relations. Hence operations on coupled relations, such as
union and inclusion, are defined component-wise.) However, Corollary 7.12 and Theorem 7.16 tell
us that there is indeed a largest bisimulation, namely the pair (≃FS⊕ ,≅
FS
⊕ ).
With logical (as well as environmental) bisimulations, up-to techniques are particularly important
to relieve the burden of proving concrete equalities. A powerful up-to technique in higher-order
languages is up-to contexts. We present a form of up-to contexts combined with the big-step version
of logical bisimilarity. Below, for a relation R on Λ⊕, we write R
CFS for the closure of the relation
under general (closing) ΛFS⊕ contexts.
Definition 7.18 A coupled relation R is a big-step coupled logical bisimulation up-to contexts if
whenever E R2 F , the following holds: if E  Z then F  Y with Σ(Z) = Σ(Y ), and for all
M RC1 N , we have (Z •M) R
CFS
1 (Y •N).
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For the soundness proof, we first derive the soundness of a small-step up-to context technique, whose
proof, in turn, is similar to that of Lemma 7.10 (the up-to-formal-sums technique of Definition 7.8
already allows some context manipulation; we need this technique for the proof of the up-to-contexts
technique).
Example 7.19 We have seen that the terms expone and exptwo of Example 2.6 are not applicative
bisimilar. We can show that they are context equivalent, by proving that they are coupled bisimilar.
We sketch a proof of this, in which we employ the up-to technique from Definition 7.18. We use the
coupled relation R in which R1
def
= {(expone, exptwo)}, and R2
def
= R1 ∪ {(AM , BN ) | M R
C
1 N}
where AM
def
= λn.((Mn) ⊕ (exponeM (n + 1))), and BN
def
= (λx.Nx) ⊕ (exptwo (λx.N(x + 1))).
This is a big-step coupled logical bisimulation up-to contexts. The interesting part is the matching
argument for the terms AM , BN ; upon receiving an argument m they yield the summed values
Σi〈M(m+ 1), pi〉 and Σi〈N(m+ 1), pi〉 (for some pi’s), and these are in R
CFS
1 .
8 Beyond Call-by-Name Reduction
So far, we have studied the problem of giving sound (and sometime complete) coinductive methods
for program equivalence in a probabilistic λ-calculus endowed with call-by-name reduction. One
may wonder whether what we have obtained can be adapted to other notions of reduction, and in
particular to call-by-value reduction (e.g., the call-by-value operational semantics of Λ⊕ from [10]).
Since our construction of a labelled Markov chain for Λ⊕ is somehow independent on the
underlying operational semantics, defining a call-by-value probabilistic applicative bisimulation is
effortless. The proofs of congruence of the bisimilarity and its soundness in this paper can also be
transplanted to call-by-value. In defining Λ⊕ as a multisorted labelled Markov chain for the strict
regime, one should recall that functions are applied to values only.
Definition 8.1 Λ⊕ can be seen as a multisorted labelled Markov chain (Λ⊕(∅) ⊎ VΛ⊕,VΛ⊕ ⊎
{τ},P⊕) that we denote with Λ⊕v. Please observe that, contrary to how we gave Definition 3.1 for
call-by-name semantics, labels here are either values, which model parameter passing, or τ , that
models evaluation. We define the transition probability matrix P⊕ as follows:
• For every term M and for every distinguished value νx.N ,
P⊕(M, τ, νx.N)
def
= [[M ]](νx.N);
• For every value V and for every distinguished value νx.N ,
P⊕(νx.N, V,N{V/x})
def
= 1;
• In all other cases, P⊕ returns 0.
Then, similarly to the call-by-name case, one can define both probabilistic applicative simulation
and bisimulation notions as probabilistic simulation and bisimulation on Λ⊕v. This way one
can define probabilistic applicative bisimilarity, which is denoted ∼v, and probabilistic applicative
similarity, denoted .
v
.
Proving that .
v
is a precongruence, follows the reasoning we have outlined for the lazy regime.
Of course, one must prove a Key Lemma first.
Lemma 8.2 IfM .
v
H N , then for every X ⊆ Λ⊕(x) it holds that [[M ]](λx.X) ≤ [[N ]](λx.(.v
H(X))).
As the statement, the proof is not particularly different from the one we have provided for
Lemma 3.17. The only delicate case is obviously that of application. This is due to its operational
semantics that, now, takes into account also the distribution of values the parameter reduces to.
Anyway, one can prove ∼v of implying context equivalence.
When we restrict our attention to pure λ-terms, as we do in Section 6, we are strongly relying
on call-by-name evaluation: LLT’s only reflect term equivalence in a call-by-name lazy regime. We
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leave the task of generalizing the results to eager evaluation to future work, but we conjecture
that, in that setting, probabilistic choice alone does not give contexts the same discriminating
power as probabilistic bisimulation. Similarly we have not investigated the call-by-value version of
coupled logical bisimilarity, as our current proofs rely on the appearance of formal sums only in
redex position, a constraint that would probably have to be lifted for call-by-value.
9 A Comparison with Nondeterminism
Syntactically, Λ⊕ is identical to an eponymous language introduced by de’Liguoro and Piperno [13].
The semantics we present here, however, is quantitative, and this has of course a great impact on
context equivalence. While in a nondeterministic setting what one observes is the possibility of
converging (or of diverging, or both), terms with different convergence probabilities are considered
different in an essential way here. Actually, nondeterministic context equivalence and probabilistic
context equivalence are incomparable. As an example of terms that are context equivalent in
the must sense but not probabilistically, we can take I ⊕ (I ⊕ Ω) and I ⊕ Ω. Conversely, I is
probabilistically equivalent to any term M that reduces to I ⊕M (which can be defined using
fixed-point combinators), while I and M are not equivalent in the must sense, since the latter can
diverge (the divergence is irrelevant probabilistically because it has probability zero). May context
equivalence, in contrast, is coarser than probabilistic context equivalence.
Despite the differences, the two semantics have similarities. Analogously to what happens in
nondeterministic λ-calculi, applicative bisimulation and context equivalence do not coincide in the
probabilistic setting, at least if call-by-name is considered. The counterexamples to full abstraction
are much more complicated in call-by-value λ-calculi [27], and cannot be easily adapted to the
probabilistic setting.
10 Conclusions
This is the first paper in which bisimulation techniques for program equivalence are shown to be
applicable to probabilistic λ-calculi.
On the one hand, Abramsky’s idea of seeing interaction as application is shown to be amenable to
a probabilistic treatment, giving rise to a congruence relation that is sound for context equivalence.
Completeness, however, fails: the way probabilistic applicative bisimulation is defined allows one to
distinguish terms that are context equivalent, but which behave differently as for when choices and
interactions are performed. On the other, a notion of coupled logical bisimulation is introduced and
proved to precisely characterise context equivalence for Λ⊕. Along the way, applicative bisimilarity
is proved to coincide with context equivalence on pure λ-terms, yielding the Levy-Longo tree
equality.
The crucial difference between the two main bisimulations studied in the paper is not the
style (applicative vis-a`-vis logical), but rather the fact that while applicative bisimulation insists
on relating only individual terms, coupled logical bisimulation is more flexible and allows us
to relate formal sums (which we may think as distributions). This also explains why we need
distinct reduction rules for the two bisimulations. See examples 3.38 and 7.5. While not complete,
applicative bisimulation, as it stands, is simpler to use than coupled logical bisimulation. Moreover
it is a natural form of bisimulation, and it should be interesting trying to transport the techniques
for handling it onto variants or extensions of the language.
Topics for future work abound — some have already been hinted at in earlier sections. Among
the most interesting ones, one can mention the transport of applicative bisimulation onto the
language ΛFS⊕ . We conjecture that the resulting relation would coincide with coupled logical
bisimilarity and context equivalence, but going through Howe’s technique seems more difficult than
for Λ⊕, given the infinitary nature of formal sums and their confinement to redex positions.
Also interesting would be a more effective notion of equivalence: even if the two introduced
notions of bisimulation avoid universal quantifications over all possible contexts, they refer to an
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essentially infinitary operational semantics in which the meaning of a term is obtained as the least
upper bound of all its finite approximations. Would it be possible to define bisimulation in terms
of approximations without getting too fine grained?
Bisimulations in the style of logical bisimulation (or environmental bisimulation) are known
to require up-to techniques in order to avoid tedious equality proofs on concrete terms. In the
paper we have introduced some up-to techniques for coupled logical bisimilarity, but additional
techniques would be useful. Up-to techniques could also be developed for applicative bisimilarity.
More in the long-run, we would like to develop sound operational techniques for so-called
computational indistinguishability, a key notion in modern cryptography. Computational indistin-
guishability is defined similarly to context equivalence; the context is however required to work
within appropriate resource bounds, while the two terms can have different observable behaviors
(although with negligible probability). We see this work as a very first step in this direction: com-
plexity bounds are not yet there, but probabilistic behaviour, an essential ingredient, is correctly
taken into account.
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